

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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TWO CATHOLIC CRITIQUES OF PERSONALISM

JULES A. BAISNEE

REMARKS ON SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING SENSATION

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PROFESSOR MARITAIN ON PHILOSOPHICAL CO-OPERATION

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JAMES COLLINS

EDITORIAL

BOOK NOTES

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TWO CATHOLIC CRITIQUES OF PERSONALISM

THE INCREASING interest of American Catholics in Personalism is due no doubt to a large extent to the presence of Jacques Maritain in this country. Had not the eminent exponent of Thomistic philosophy lent the support of his authority to that movement, it is likely that it would have remained confined to France, where it originated, and developed around the Review *Esprit*. However we quite understand the appeal of such a theory. Starting with the metaphysical distinction between the individual and the person and deriving from this distinction a whole ethical, social, and political system, the Catholic apologist is provided with a strong defense position against the inroads of totalitarianism and a powerful argument for the recognition of the rights of the laboring class and all oppressed minorities.

This does not mean that Personalism has rallied the unanimous support of Catholic writers. As late as 1938, Fr. Pedro Descoqs, the well known professor of philosophy in the Jesuit Scholasticate of Jersey challenged the metaphysical basis of the system in the *Archives de Philosophie*.¹ Last year Professor Charles de Koninck, Dean of the faculty of philosophy of Laval University and Vice-President of the American Philosophical Association, denounced² the Personalists' distortion of the notion of Common Good; Cardinal Villeneuve, Archbishop of Quebec, added the weight of his authority to this condemnation of the new theory in which he saw a real danger

¹ "Individu et personne," XIV, cahier 2, 1-58. An article by John A. Creaveny in *The New Scholasticism*, XVII (1943), 231-250, "Person and Individual," gives the substance of Fr. Descoqs' article in the *Archives*.

² Cf. *De la primauté du bien commun contre les Personnalistes. Le principe de l'ordre nouveau*. (Québec: Editions de l'Université Laval, 1943.)

of revival of Pelagianism.³ Finally, in a recent issue of *Thought*⁴ Professor Louis J. A. Mercier of Harvard University points out the "disturbing aspects of Maritain's Conception of Integral Humanism."

The reader will find in the essays of Fr. Descoqs and Professor de Koninck an objective statement of the main points of Personalism and a fair discussion of the arguments advanced in support of it. The two essays are complementary since the first author approaches the doctrine from the metaphysical viewpoint and the other is concerned with its moral implications. But unlike Fr. Descoqs who gives liberal references to the authors he criticizes, Professor de Koninck seems to deal with the Personalists as it were impersonally, being content with introducing their arguments with such formula as "on prétend" or "on a voulu conclure."⁵ Thus the task of ascertaining the sources of the arguments and the correctness of their interpretation is made very difficult if not impossible.

Taking these two authors as our guides we shall attempt in the following pages to give the readers of *The Modern Schoolman* a clear statement and a fair criticism of the two fundamental theses of Personalism: (1) the distinction between Individual and Person; (2) the concept of the Common Good.

I. INDIVIDUAL AND PERSON

While they agree in their contention that the person is distinct from the individual, and while it is easy to recognize an identity of inspiration in their descriptions of the respective characteristics of the individual and of the person, the Personalists do not seem to have come to a clear definition of either the person or the individual.

FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF MORALITY

Let us first hear Emmanuel Mounier, the editor of *Esprit* and the author of *A Personalist Manifesto*:

A person is a spiritual being constituted as such by its manner of existence and independence of being; it maintains this existence by its adhesion to a hierarchy of values that it has freely adopted, assimilated, and lived by its responsible activity and by a constant interior development; thus it unifies all its activity in freedom and by means of creative acts develops the individuality of its vocation.⁶

From this definition of person we gather that the mark of person-

³ Preface, p. xxii.

⁴ XIX (June, 1944), 229-246. In a letter published in the September issue (pp. 573-575) Professor Maritain has replied to some points in Professor Mercier's article.

⁵ The only exception is found on p. 130, in which a reference is made to an article by Mortimer Adler and Walter Farrell in the *Thomist*, IV (1942), 323-324.

⁶ Emmanuel Mounier, *A Personalist Manifesto*, translated from the French by the Monks of St. John's Abbey, (Longmans, 1938), p. 4.

ality is spirituality which implies freedom, responsibility, morality, and progress. Some of these notes reappear and others are added when Mounier contrasts the person with the individual.⁷ Five fundamental aspects are stressed: (1) Individuality connotes dispersion and avarice, while the person is characterized by self-possession and self-determination and generosity. (2) Individuality is dispersion, the person is integration, i.e., progressive integration of one's acts, mental states, and "personages." Every person has a vocation, that is, a living and creative principle, which he alone can find and thus realize his destiny. (3) My person is not the consciousness I have of it—it is something beyond consciousness and beyond time, which, contrary to the shrivelling of the individual that is bent on ownership, spurs me to "a constant effort at advancement and detachment, therefore at renunciation, dispossession, and spiritualization." (4) The person brings into this world a new dimension of liberty, not the liberty of bourgeois liberalism which is content with a simple adherence to public patterns, but a spiritual liberty which is an adhesion freely consented to and inspired by a liberating spiritual life. (5) Lastly "we find human communion implanted in the very heart of the person as an integrating factor of its existence."

The reader can see that the object of Emmanuel Mounier in his analysis of personality is not to define the metaphysical ground of the distinction between the person, i.e., the individual being endowed with intelligence and freedom and therefore "*sui ipsius et sui juris*," and the beings that are devoid of intelligence and freedom and therefore are called "*mera supposita*." Rather he is concerned with deriving whatever moral corollaries can be derived from the fact that man has a rational nature and therefore is a person. Because of his rational nature or personality, man has freedom and is a morally responsible agent; he has a destiny and a vocation which he is bound to fulfill and which requires the subordination of his lower inclinations to his higher aspirations even at the cost of detachment and renunciation; finally he is not, or rather he cannot be satisfied with being purely self-centered or selfish, but is inclined to generosity and charity. If individualism connotes pure selfishness, the person will not be an "individualist," but he will remain an individual.

In his *Politique de la Personne*⁸ Denis de Rougemont, whose orientation is avowedly Protestant, defines the individual as "a man without destiny, without vocation, without any purpose in life, and without any obligation." Because the individual is subordinated to the species, as a "part of a whole" which is pre-existent to it, the individual is doomed to be absorbed by the State. The person, on the contrary, is

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-88.

⁸ (Paris: Editions "Je sers," 1934); pp. 52-53.

characterized by a vocation. "Person and vocation are inseparable. Both presuppose that unique act of obedience to the divine command of loving our neighbor . . . Three words define the person: act, presence, and pledge; and the same three words define what Christ bids us to be: good neighbors." There seems to be an irreducible antithesis between the person and the individual: while the individual is shut up within itself like an amorphous cell which is lost in the mass, the person affirms his responsibility, is conscious of his mission among men, and is willing to take whatever risks are involved in his mission even at the cost of an heroic effort. Hence "the true social cell is the person and not the family which is subordinated to the person." And in the State "the primacy of the person constitutes the only real authority, a radiating authority which is not based upon material force, but on the creative, regulative power [of the person]."

Let us note here the words "part of a whole," which the author uses to define man's relation to the species, to the family, and to the State, and the primacy ascribed to the person as the only real authority. We shall have to recall them when we come to the consideration of the concept of the Common Good by the Personalists. Here we may be content with remarking that, like E. Mounier, Denis de Rougemont stresses the ethical rather than the metaphysical aspect of personality. Because of his rational nature man has duties, and man has a destiny and a vocation. To this we can fully agree without accepting the author's views regarding the supremacy of the person.

FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF METAPHYSICS

With the next three authors, M. Vialatoux, M. Lemarié, and Henri Simon, whose views are analysed by Fr. Descoqs, we come nearer to a metaphysical definition of the individual and of the person.

In his "Reflexions sur l'individu et la personne,"¹⁰ M. Vialatoux writes: "The term *individual* awakes in our mind the immediate, though confused, feeling of the vital and mental powers which operate in individual bodies and in social groups; the term *person* awakes the feeling of the spiritual reality which directs and controls our moral life." Then applying his definitions to the social order, he opposes the groups of individuals which are united by mere biological and psychological bonds to the groups of persons which are united by a spiritual bond of love. Man in his view is both an individual and person, because he partakes of both the biological and the moral order. "There should be neither confusion nor separation of these two aspects of our complex human nature. It is important to distinguish them, not to make a choice between them, but to unite them according to their essential relations, and to recognize their hierarchy according to the difference which exists between the respective orien-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁰ Cf. *Chronique Sociale de France*, Mai, 1936 (*et seq.*), p. 341.

tations of their powers and the respective goals of their destinies."¹¹

We note the author's warning against separating the two aspects of human nature, but we wonder if he does not himself pave the way for such a separation and for the false consequences that flow from it when he says that man is an individual *and* a person; we prefer to call man an individual endowed with personality, and while we recognize the hierarchy of human faculties, of human needs, and human aspirations, we ascribe them all to the same individual who is as truly a person when he exercises his lower faculties and satisfies his lower needs as when he exercises his higher faculties and obeys his higher aspirations.

For M. Lemarié, author of an *Essai sur la personne*, the human being reaches his individual (animal) maturity before he attains personal maturity in the awakening of conscience which marks his "second birth." The person differs from the individual in this that "his existence is not a mere *fact* as is the existence of other living organisms, but is above all a *value*, or rather the duty of acquiring a value."¹² Duty then is the basic element, and freedom the very root of personality. Even in God "the essential attribute is not Thought and Knowledge, because knowledge alone does not give reality to its object, it cannot will its object. . . . The Divine Being is essentially Will, Love, and creative Power, which attributes are all presupposed by Knowledge. For only Power can impart existence; Will alone can set an end to action; and Love alone can give moral value to action." Now man possesses on a small scale the traits of the Divine Person. He is not primarily a "thinking being," i.e., a kind of fragment of Pure Reason; he is a Power, an Energy possessed of freedom whose vocation it is to mark his passage through life by a generous act of self-consecration. Hence "freedom is the very basis of personality."¹³ The reader need not be told how far this voluntaristic interpretation of personality is from traditional metaphysics which finds the root of freedom in knowledge and the root of knowledge in being.

Though Henri Simon in his *Destins de la personne* is primarily concerned with the definition of culture and the reorganization of the commonwealth, he bases his reflexions on the "supremacy of the person" of which he writes:

This formula could be rejected as smacking of anarchy only by such as have not grasped the fundamental distinction between Person and Individual, upon which rests our attempt at reconstructing our concepts of society and of culture. By Individual we understand man as a social being in his relations to Society, viz. to the conditions of his political

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

¹² *Essai sur la personne* (Paris: Alcan, 1936), p. 88.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-113.

destiny. By Person we understand man as a spiritual being in his relations to the Universe, viz. to the conditions of his total destiny. In regard to Society, the Individual is but an abstraction; what a poor thing would a social being be apart from the society which informs and rears it. Both Sociologism and Positivism have grasped this truth, that Society is the first reality and would be doomed if primacy were ascribed to the Individual. On the contrary, the Person has reality; nay it is the supreme reality, the human Absolute, and in regard to the Person it is Society that is an abstraction.¹⁴

In this text we find the clear enunciation of the division between the human individual and the human person and of the consequences which the Personalists derive from the assumption in their political philosophy. Man as an individual belongs to society which can exercise a complete control over his behavior as an individual, but as a person he stands above society. Furthermore the common good of society is not the good of the person, but this point will be considered when we come to the problem of the Common Good.

PERSONALISTS AND PERSONALISM

At least from 1925 when he wrote *Trois Réformateurs: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau*,¹⁵ to 1942 when he wrote *Les Droits de l'homme et la loi naturelle*,¹⁶ Jacques Maritain has consistently upheld the distinction between the Individual and the Person. In the latter work he refers particularly to his earlier essay, *Freedom in the Modern World*,¹⁷ and to the chapter on "The Human Person and Society" in his *Scholasticism and Politics*;¹⁸ for a more complete treatment of this distinction, he invokes the authority of the eminent Dominican Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, by quoting a passage of *Le Sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques*¹⁹ which gives the formula of the Personalists' favorite argument in proof of the distinction between the Individual and the Person. The argument reads:

Man will reach the fulness of personality, will become a *per se subsistens* and a *per se operans* only in the measure in which in him reason and freedom control his senses and his passions; otherwise he will remain like the animal, merely an individual enslaved by events and circumstances, always under the influence of something alien to himself; *he will be merely a part, ever incapable of being a whole.* (Italics ours.)

One paragraph of *The Rights of Man* (pp. 2-3) may be given here as the expression of Mr. Maritain's mature thought:

Whenever we say that a man is a person, we mean that he is more than a mere parcel of matter, more than an individual element in nature, such as an atom, a blade of grass, a fly, or an elephant. . . Man is an animal and

¹⁴ *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée* (No. 31, Bloud, 1935), p. 5.

¹⁵ Translated, *Three Reformers* . . . (Scribners, 1929 and 1937).

¹⁶ Translated, *The Rights of Man and the Natural Law* (Scribners, 1943).

¹⁷ Translated by Richard O'Sullivan, (Scribners, 1936).

¹⁸ Translated by Mortimer Adler, (Macmillan, 1940).

¹⁹ Second edition, pp. 332-333.

an individual, but unlike other animals or individuals, man is an individual who holds himself in hand by his intelligence and his will. He exists not merely physically; there is in him a richer and nobler existence; he has a spiritual superexistence through knowledge and through love. He is thus in some fashion a whole, not merely a part; he is a universe unto himself, a microcosm in which the whole great universe can be encompassed through knowledge; and through love he can give himself freely to beings who are, as it were, other selves to him.

The social implications of the distinction between the Individual and the Person in the mind of the Personalists are explicitly stated by the Very Rev. M. S. Gillet, O.P., in *Culture latine et ordre social* in which he makes this distinction the very basis of his whole social philosophy. "Tout l'ordre social résulte de cette opposition." More explicitly than Maritain he separates the person from the individual.

We call person the spiritual principle which, in the order of being, sums up and unifies the constitutive elements of the human composite, and, in the order of action, becomes the responsible principle of the human acts. The name individual on the contrary, is reserved to denote in every one of us that original resultant of all the material, but accidental elements by which bodies are differentiated, and which is in various degrees the effect of sex, temperament, race, heredity, soil, and climate.²⁰

And still more tersely in a paper read at the Semaine Sociale de Lille, 1932: "Man, who is an individual by his body and, on that account, dependent on a multitude of conditions, is by his soul a person and thus possesses a relative independence."

Before we go on examining the main arguments advanced by Personalists in support of their thesis, we cannot help calling the reader's attention to the stress laid by them on the distinction between soul and body. Their language smacks of Platonism and Cartesianism; for them man is not the *compositum humanum*, but rather a soul dwelling in a body which it uses and controls when it is not overcome by it. It is true that man is a person because of his spiritual soul, but the body as well as the soul is a constitutive element of the person.

Personalists attempt to link the distinction between the individual and the person with St. Thomas' theory about the principle of individuation. For instance Jacques Maritain argues as follows: "For St. Thomas individuality, or more precisely individuation, is that in virtue of which a thing that shares its nature with another still differs from it within a common species or genus." Hence because He is Pure Act, because of His transcendence over every other being, God has individuality by the very fact that He is God. "If then things are individualized by the very reason which differentiates them from God, finite beings are individual because there is in them an element of non-being." In all creatures the act of existence is limited by potency; in material beings the limiting element is matter. Hence

²⁰ *Culture latine et ordre social* (Paris: Flammarion, 1935), p. 27.

"for man matter is the ontological root of individuality."²¹

CRITICISM

Granting that such is St. Thomas' teaching regarding the principle of individuation, we may ask with Fr. Descoqs whether this is the point at issue. What we want to know is not how it happens that there are many individuals in a given species, but what constitutes individuality, and whether we can oppose personality to individuality in man. Far from opposing them St. Thomas associates them so closely that he seems to identify them. Stating the difference between the person in God and the person in man, he writes:

Persona in communi significat substantiam individuum rationalis naturae, ut dictum est. Individuum autem est quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum. Persona igitur, in quacumque natura, significat id quod est distinctum in natura illa; sicut in humana natura significat has carnes et haec ossa et hanc animam, quae sunt principia individuantia hominem; quae quidem, licet non sint de significatione personae, sunt tamen de significatione personae humanae.²²

In other words in man the very same notes by which we know him as an individual are those by which we recognize his personality.²³

One of the favorite arguments of Personalists is based upon their conception of the person as "a whole" and of the individual as "a part." Already in *Trois Reformateurs* Jacques Maritain had written: "The whole theory of individuation shows that, in the eyes of St. Thomas, the individual as such is a part. . . . On the other hand . . . the notion of personality as such implies the independence of the person as a whole."²⁴ In his latest work on the subject, *The Rights of Man*, he tries to interpret a text of St. Thomas which seems to affirm the subordination of man to society as a part to a whole: "Quaelibet persona singularis comparatur ad totam communitatem sicut pars ad totum,"²⁵ by means of another text which states that "if the entire man is engaged as a part in political society (since he may be called upon to give his life for it), he is nevertheless not a part of political society by *virtue of himself as a whole* and by virtue of all that is in him,"²⁶ or as St. Thomas says, "Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua . . . sed

²¹ Here we follow the account given by Fr. Descoqs in *Archives de Philosophie*, XIV, cahier 2, 19-20. His reference is to Maritain's "Reflexions sur la personne humaine et la philosophie de culture," in *Cahiers Laennec*, September, 1935, to which we have no access.

²² S.T. I. 29. 4c.

²³ This interpretation of St. Thomas' position is supported by E. Gilson in *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, chap. 10, "Christian Personalism," and by Fr. de Broglie in *Recherches de Science Religieuse* (1935), p. 37, where he says: "This mysterious anti-thesis between our person and our individual was unknown to St. Thomas."

²⁴ New edition, pp. 276-277.

²⁵ S.T. II-II. 64. 2c.

²⁶ *The Rights of Man*, p. 14.

totum quod homo est et quod potest et habet ordinandum est ad Deum."²⁷

We quite agree that in the hierarchy of duties man's duties to God stand above his duties to society and that God alone can claim all man's thoughts and affections, man's whole inner life. From this it follows that no totalitarian state can impose a rule of thinking on man's intelligence and a code of right living on his will. But we do not see how this distinction among duties can be made the basis of a distinction in man between the individual and the person. The first distinction pertains to the moral order; the other pertains to the ontological order. Because man has different duties it does not follow that he is split in two parts, the individual and the person, one of which would belong to the state while the other would be independent of the state. St. Thomas says explicitly, and Maritain agrees, that it is the whole man, "*persona singularis*," that is engaged "as part in political society."

The same fallacy, a "*transitus de genere ad genus*," can be detected in another argument which starts from the characterization of the individual as "shut-in" and of the person as "open." For the Personalists this means that individuality connotes all tendencies that are directed by self-interest: self-preservation, self-indulgence, selfishness and the like, while personality connotes the opposite altruistic tendencies: detachment, generosity, etc.

It is quite true that man is the first being in nature that is not exclusively concerned with its own interests and with the interest of the species to which it belongs; he is the first to enter into personal relations with his fellow-creatures and with God, his Creator. It is true also that we often call individualism the mental and moral attitude which centers man's thoughts and interests on himself. But this does not justify the inference which is drawn by the Personalists as to the distinction between the individual and the person. It is the person who determines his attitude rightly or wrongly. The Personalists' interpretation is so arbitrary that an argument can be built upon their own premises to prove that it is the individual that is "open" and the person that is "shut-in." Fr. Descoqs formulates this argument in these words:

As a member of the human species, man is never entirely separated from his fellow-men, but is in constant vital relationship with the community of which he is a member, and "open" to the influence of the other members. Nay more, the individual man, because of the higher degree of perfection and differentiation he can attain, is the more "open" to all forms of expansion and more capable of deep and delicate love, as he is more free with regard to his fellow-men. He is all that precisely because he belongs to a species and therefore is an individual in the sense given to the word by our modern authors.

²⁷ S.T. I. 21. 4 ad 3.

Inversely, it is because of his personality that he exists "for himself" in self-defence, in resistance, and in attack. His conscience is literally an inviolable asylum which can never be forced. Under duress his freedom of action may be restrained to the point of vanishing, and yet his inner freedom remains untouched. It is only in the measure in which he is a free person that he directs and controls his moral activity to the best of his own interests. Therefore we may say that it is as a person that man is "shut-in," impervious to external influences, and as an individual that he is "open."²⁸

There is then no metaphysical ground for the distinction which Personalists would introduce in man between the individual and the person, and still less for linking man's individuality solely with his corporeal nature and his personality with his spiritual soul apart from his body. Lower creatures are mere individuals, "mera supposita," man alone among terrestrial beings is a person, that is, an individual possessed of a rational nature, and for that reason possessing rights and subject to moral obligation, and therefore excelling in dignity all lower creatures, "sui ipsius et sui juris." But it is the whole man, body and soul, who is an individual, and the whole man, soul and body, who is a person. Therefore it is as a person as well as an individual that man is a member of society, partaking of the benefits which accrue to him from his association with his fellow-men, but in turn bound to co-operate to the common welfare, to submit to legitimate authority, and to serve in the defence of the city even to the peril of his life. This leads to the consideration of Personalism and the Common Good.

II. PERSONALISM AND THE COMMON GOOD

Professor de Koninck examines the doctrine of Personalism in the light of St. Thomas' teaching on the primacy of the Common Good. But as every ethical doctrine has not only a metaphysical, but also a historical background, he has been well inspired in adding to his main essay a sketch in which he traces the origins of the now prevailing totalitarian conceptions of man and of the State.²⁹

BACKGROUND OF MODERN "PRACTICALITY"

A broad survey of the history of modern philosophy reveals a growing distrust of speculative reason which leads to a renewal of the old Heraclitean subjectivism and to the substitution of art for prudence and wisdom. It started with the Humanism of the Renaissance of which we read in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* that it "was essentially a revolt against intellectual, and especially ecclesiastical authority, and is the parent of all modern developments whether in-

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

²⁹ Under a new title, "Le Principe de l'ordre nouveau," and in a somewhat recast form, this is a paper which was read at a meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Cf. *Proceedings*, XVII (1941), 52-64, "Metaphysics and International Order."

tellectual, scientific or social.”³⁰ Of this spirit we find a revealing echo in a few lines of Pico della Mirandola: God addresses Adam in these words: “Definita caeteris natura intra praescriptas a nobis leges coercetur. Tu nullis angustiiis coercitus pro tuo arbitrio in cuius manu te posui tibi illam praeficies. . . tu tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque plastes et fctor, in quam malueris tute formam effingas.”³¹

The same dream of diverting man from pure speculation to the development of practical science which would make men “the lords of nature,” seems to have been entertained by Descartes who writes in his *Discourse on Method*, Part VI:

I perceived it to be possible to arrive at knowledge highly useful in life; and in room of the speculative philosophy usually taught in the schools, to discover a practical, by means of which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans, we might also apply them in the same way to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature.³²

Hume likewise in his *Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding* disapproves of abstruse thought and profound researches because of “the pensive melancholy which they introduce [and] the endless uncertainty in which they involve [us],” but he counsels his reader: “Indulge your passion for science . . . but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society.”³³

The tremendous progress in the various fields of natural science and in the practical applications shows to what degree the modern mind has followed Descartes and Hume’s shifting of interest from pure speculation to science and industry. Their influence was no less strong in bringing about the substitution of the subjective for the objective approach to philosophy, literature, and even history. Modern philosophical systems, always aiming at emancipating man, are often presented as the expression of the personality of their authors. Kant rejects metaphysics and makes mathematics a purely mental construct while he bases physics on the subjective categories of the understanding. With Hegel logic ceases to be an instrument, but becomes the method which enables reason to recognize itself in every object and makes pure thought of all reality. His denial of the principle of contradiction and the recognition of the inner contradictions in the very essence of things have become the cardinal tenets of Dialectic Materialism, the official philosophy of Socialism and Communism from Karl Marx to Lenin and Stalin. But it is important

³⁰ Eleventh edition, XIII, 872.

³¹ Quoted by de Koninck, *op. cit.*, p. 188, from *Oratio. . .* (Paris, 1517).

³² Everyman’s Library edition (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.), p. 49.

³³ Clarendon Press edition, 1894, p. 9.

to note that for Marx as for the Humanists of the preceding age the goal is always the emancipation of the human person. Witness the blasphemous words of Karl Marx: "Philosophy owns it openly. It has adopted as its own the profession of Prometheus: 'I hate all gods'; such is, and such always will be its challenge to all the gods of heaven and earth who refuse to acknowledge human conscience as the highest divinity which admits of no rival."³⁴

It would be absurd to see a logical or a psychological connection between the advocacy of Personalism and the extreme claims of Humanism and Totalitarianism. Error is nothing but a distortion of truth. Still it is of the utmost importance for Catholic thinkers to guard their thought and their language against any possible confusion and misinterpretation. Professor de K  ninck has therefore rendered a distinct service to Catholic thought in reaffirming the authentic concepts of person and of the common good even if his warning of the Personalists appears to be a hard saying.

BONUM COMMUNE AND BONUM PROPRIUM

According to the author the peril implied in the new doctrine of Personalism arises from a twofold confusion or a twofold error, one in the speculative, the other in the practical order.³⁵ In the speculative order they make the mistake of presenting the common good as a "bonum alienum," and the singular or individual good as the only proper good that should be pursued by the person. On such an assumption the subordination of the personal good to the common good thus understood would mean the subordination of the highest good of the person to a good that would be alien to it; the person would cease to be a whole and there could exist no communion between the parts and the whole. In the practical order this would mean a tendency to make man self-centered and to prompt him to emphasize his autonomy. Once man had been endowed by God with freedom, he would have the power and the right to submit or not to submit to the divinely established order. His voluntary submission would be an act of pure generosity, a free expansion and diffusion of the good which would be his own because he would be the source of it. Hence the insistence among Personalists on the autonomy of the person and their claim that the person stands above society and even above the universe.

Following St. Thomas, the author analyses the concepts of "bonum commune" and "bonum proprium," and shows that far from being opposed to each other the two goods are identical, or more precisely that it is in the common, rightly understood, that all creatures, and therefore the human person, find their own private or proper good.

³⁴ Cited by de Koninck, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

³⁵ De Koninck, *op. cit.*, pp. 30 ff.

This truth he finds expressed in St. Thomas: "Natura reflectitur in seipsam non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, sed multo magis quantum ad commune: inclinatur enim unumquodque ad conservandum non solum suum individuum, sed etiam suam speciem. Et multo magis habet naturalem inclinationem unumquodque in id quod est bonum universale simpliciter."³⁶ Moreover this common good is pursued by the individual not to be appropriated but to be preserved and diffused, according to these words of St. Thomas: "Sic igitur amare bonum quod a beatis participatur ut habeatur vel possideatur, non facit hominem bene se habentem ad beatitudinem, quia etiam male illud bonum concupiscunt; sed amare illud bonum secundum se, ut permaneat et diffundatur, et ut nihil contra illud bonum agatur, hoc facit hominem bene se habentem ad illam societatem beatorum."³⁷

But as the common good may be understood first in a restricted sense, the good of the society of which man is a member, and the good of the universe of which man is a part, we must now consider the relation of the person to the common good first as good of the community, and secondly as good of the universe.

PERSON AND THE GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY

Because they conceive personality as involving totality and independence Personalists seem inclined to belittle the common good in the social and political sense of the term. They quote St. Thomas: "Homo non ordinatur ad societatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua";³⁸ and they cover themselves with the authority of Pius XI, in his Encyclical "Divini Redemptoris": "Civitas homini, non homo Civitati existit."³⁹ We gladly acknowledge the lofty way in which Jacques Maritain interprets this subordination of political society to the person:

The common good of society is neither a mere collection of private good, nor the good proper to a whole. . . It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons . . . their communion in the good life; it is therefore common to the whole and to the parts, to the parts, which are themselves wholes, since the very notion of *person* means totality; it is common to the whole and to the parts, over which it flows back and which must all benefit from it.⁴⁰

Nevertheless we see the force of Professor de Koninck's objection to the thesis of the Personalists⁴¹ which assumes that in the providential order man is primarily and absolutely a "whole" and only

³⁶ S.T. I. 60. 5 ad 3.

³⁷ *De Caritate*, art. 2c.

³⁸ S.T. I-II. 21. 4 ad 3.

³⁹ *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, XXIX (1937), 79.

⁴⁰ *The Rights of Man*, pp. 6-7.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

secondarily a "part"; from which it would follow that political virtues are accessory to personal virtues. The truth is that the human person is by his nature part of society, dependent on society, and bound in duty to seek the common good of the body political. We need only to recall the emphasis laid by St. Thomas first on the duty of civic obedience: "Cum quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est quod aliquis homo sit bonus, nisi bene proportionatus bono communi; nec totum potest bene existere nisi ex partibus bene proportionatis";⁴² secondly on the duty of loving the city, or, as we would say today, the country: "...ad hoc quod aliquis sit bonus politicus, requiritur quod amet bonum civitatis";⁴³ thirdly on the motive which gives its grandeur to the soldier's supreme sacrifice: "...fortitudo [non] est circa mortem quam aliquis sustinet in quocumque casu vel negotio. . . sed circa mortem quam quis sustinet pro optimis rebus, sicut contingit cum aliquis moritur in bello propter patriae defensionem."⁴⁴ Hence also the pre-eminence St. Thomas assigns to the virtue of the civic ruler in whom he recognizes the very image of God: "Est praecipua virtus qua homo aliquis non solum seipsum, sed etiam alios dirigere potest; et tanto magis, quanto plurium est regitiva...consequens igitur est bonos reges Deo esse acceptissimos, et ab eo maxime praemiandos."⁴⁵

PERSON AND THE GOOD OF THE UNIVERSE

It is not only with regard to society but also regarding the whole universe that the Personalists affirm the primacy of the person; or rather they view the order of the universe as a superstructure of persons who, in the mind of God, are not mere parts but radically independent wholes. In the words of M. Violatoux:

If it is true that in the universe, the individuals exist as parts subject to a whole and that the universe necessarily unrolls its forms through the individual actions and experiences, it is not right to say that the persons are to the universe in the relation of parts to a whole. For, if it were so, they would exist for the sake of the universe, and being turned into means they would lose their personality. If the individual exists for the sake of the universe, it is for the sake of the person that the universe exists.⁴⁶

Hence the absolute value and the absolute dignity of the person lies in this that, while irrational creatures exist and are governed by God with a view to the general order of nature, the persons exist and are governed for their own sake.

⁴² *S.T.* I-II. 92. 1 ad 3.

⁴³ *In Ephes.* II. 19.

⁴⁴ *In III Ethic.*, lect. 14, nn. 537-538.

⁴⁵ *De Regimine Principum*, I. 9.

⁴⁶ *Revue Apologetique*, September, 1930, "Raison naturelle et religion surnaturelle," p. 276.

Saint Thomas does not countenance this contention of the Personalists. If he maintains that God's providence is not only general, but also individual and therefore personal: "Necesse est dicere omnia divinae providentiae subjacere, non in universali tantum, sed etiam in particulari,"⁴⁷ when he comes to explain the exercise of Providence it is to the order of the universe that he assigns the first place in the mind of God:

Bonum universi est id quod est praecipue volitum et intentum a Deo . . . unumquodque intendens aliquem finem, magis curat de eo quod est propinquius fini ultimo; quia hoc est etiam finis aliorum. Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum universi; cum ad ipsum ordinatur sicut ad finem omne particulare bonum hujus vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius; unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. Igitur quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi.⁴⁸

St. Thomas would agree that "a single human soul is of more worth than the whole universe of bodies and material goods" but he does not take the universe in such a narrow sense. He means the whole creation of which man is a part and for whose sake man as well as any other creature exists, to which therefore even though he is a person man is subordinated.

Does this subordination mean an infringement of the person's freedom and dignity?⁴⁹ Freedom, autonomy, dignity are words which come frequently under the pen of the Personalists and they insist that subordination of man to any general good but the good of God who is man's ultimate end, to any authority but the divine authority would mean a denial of man's very personality.

It is true that St. Thomas defines dignity as the perfection of being which exists and acts for itself: "Dignitas significat bonitatem alicujus propter seipsum."⁵⁰ But he explains that the dignity of rational agents is derived from the perfection of their nature and from the dignity of their end: "Sola creatura rationalis habet dominium sui actus, libere se agens ad operandum. . . [et sola] ad ipsum finem ultimum universi sua operatione pertingit."⁵¹ This does not mean that they exist for their own sake and that their dignity is the end of their existence, and still less that the universe is ordained to them as to its end. It is in their power freely to ordain their activity to the end of the universe, and so dependent is their dignity upon the end to which they must ordain their actions that they lose it when, by sin,

⁴⁷ *S.T.* I. 22. 2c.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.* III. 65.

⁴⁹ Cf. de Koninck, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-54, "La Dignité de la personne et la liberté" and "Ordre et liberté."

⁵⁰ *3 Sent.*, d. 35, l. 4, sol. 1.

⁵¹ *Sum. c. Gent.* III. 11.

they turn away from that end. "Homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit; et ideo decidit a dignitate humana."⁵² When they extol the dignity of the person the Personalists seem to lose sight of the truth that man finds his true dignity in recognizing his place in the universe which he must not dream of subordinating to himself, making the common good his own individual good.

Nor can it be said that by virtue of his freedom a person stands outside and above the universe, for freedom means control and mastery over certain acts and not over the end to which these acts must be ordained, i.e., the common good. Hence freedom does not mean complete independence, complete autonomy, for the acts of the free agent must be directed by the true judgments of practical reason which bid him to submit to the order of the universe and to seek the common good.

Because society is not a pure accident in the history of the universe, because God has made man not only a person, but a social being, it is no more true to say with Jacques Maritain that "the human person transcends all temporal societies and is superior to them,"⁵³ than to say that man transcends the universe. Like his service to God, man's service to society must be a free service, but it is a duty. And if in the hierarchy of duties, man's duties to society stand below his duties to God, is it not permitted to conclude that his social duties stand above his duties to himself? Conscious of his dignity he will not subordinate his nobler faculties and aspirations to his animal instincts, thereby falling "in servitutem bestiarum";⁵⁴ conscious of his responsibility as a social being he will ordain his activities to the common welfare, sacrifice his personal tastes for the common good, and even be ready to give up his life in the defense of his country; conscious of his duties to God which integrate and transcend his duties to himself and his duties to society he will direct all his actions to the glory of God and to extension of God's kingdom.

CONCLUSION

By denying God, Totalitarianism robs man of his responsibility and dignity, and while it clamors for the emancipation of man, it tends to reduce the citizen of the modern state to the condition which was that of the slave in pagan society. Is there lurking in the movement of Personalism an opposite but equally serious danger of fostering "by loose thinking which goes to evil to find good" what Cardinal Villeneuve does not hesitate to call "a revival of the polycephalus

⁵² *S.T.* II-II. 64. 2 ad 3.

⁵³ *The Rights of Man*, p. 13.

⁵⁴ *S.T.* II-II. 64. 2 ad 3.

monster of Pelagianism"?⁵⁵

A recent contributor to *The Commonweal* interprets Pius XII's Encyclical on the Mystical Body as "a plea for personalism" and avers that "there was a latent threat of spiritual collectivism in one wing of the German liturgical movement which may have conditioned some souls for the later invasion by nazi *Volk* ideology."⁵⁶ Are we to look for a similar pronouncement of the Supreme Authority regarding Personalism? It would not be the first time that the Church has been called to safeguard the Catholic truth against opposite errors. The excesses of Totalitarianism have threatened the freedom of the citizen and made imperative the reaffirmation of the dignity and of the rights of the human person. The excesses of individualism and liberalism endanger the very life of society and call for the reaffirmation of civil authority. Both the individual good and the common good must be preserved without sacrificing either. The role of the Catholic thinker is not an easy one, but every one ought to be on his guard against allowing himself to be swayed by dangerous formulas; every one ought to heed the warning of Cardinal Villeneuve and seek his way among conflicting systems in the light of eternal principles.

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⁵⁵ Preface, p. xxii.

⁵⁶ XXXIX (Jan. 14, 1944), 323-326.

REMARKS ON SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING SENSATION

ALTHOUGH LESS discussed than was the case not so long ago, the problems of sensation are still matter of controversy. An attempt at clarification of some of the pertinent issues seems desirable.

Notwithstanding the extensive work done on sensations, especially in the first stages of experimental psychology, certain points, though of fundamental importance, are rather obscure. It is not even agreed upon generally whether or not sensations actually "exist." The answer to this question depends largely on the meaning given in this context to the term "existing." This question will be the first to be studied in the present article.

Another, equally general question, refers to the nature of sensations and, therefore, to their definition. Here, several points deserve consideration. One may ask whether one is justified in assuming an identity of nature of all sensations, whatever their origin. One may also ask whether the correlation of certain features of sensory awareness furnish a legitimate reason for distinguishing an equal number of corresponding sensations. This problem is clearly in close relation to the first question, of the existence of sensations. If it becomes improbable that sensations exist as, in some sense, independent entities, then the distinguishable aspects in a sensorial process become only viewpoints, or their distinction perhaps one of reason only.

A third question may be characterized as dealing with the cognitive role of sensations. Do sensations, whatever they be, tell us anything of "reality" or of "object"? Or are they only partial aspects of "percepts" which alone have "objective reference"? One may state this question differently, and ask whether or not sensations are "intentional" in character.

It is my intention to submit some considerations on these three questions. I am fully aware of the impossibility of discussing in a satisfactory manner the problems these questions entail, in anything short of a complete treatise on the psychology and philosophy of sensation. But I shall feel I have contributed somewhat to the necessary clarification if the following studies will have presented, in a convincing manner, some main points and, especially, have made visible the manifold relations these problems have with others, be

it of psychology or of philosophy; most of all, however, I would wish to make clear the still quite problematic nature of this whole chapter in psychology. It seems to me that we consider too many questions as answered, too many things as evident, instead of realizing the highly complex and, in truth, unsatisfactory, state of affairs.

I

THE EXISTENCE OF SENSATIONS

A great many students of psychology have taken it for granted that such things as sensations exist, that they are the very "elements" of mental life, and that to give proof of their existence is in fact unnecessary. This rather common belief rested, so far as I can see, chiefly on three arguments, of which two are empirical, and one, speculative.

1. In a complex percept one can distinguish various features, which may, at least some of them, be observed also in themselves, in an incomplex mode of appearance. Thus, we easily distinguish in a visual percept shape and size of an object, its location in space, and its color. The latter property can be made observable, and even is sometimes under natural conditions, in isolation, as e.g. in the case of the so-called "expanded colors." It seems, therefore, reasonable to assume that all distinguishable features of a percept which cannot be analysed any further, are in principle such existent and independent entities.

2. The progress achieved by anatomy and physiology during the last, roughly, one hundred years has enabled us to correlate these distinguishable features, or a great number of them, with characteristic structures and functions of the body. We know, for instance, that location in space, by vision, depends on a series of physiological factors; that the size and shape of a seen thing are determined by the dimensions and other properties of the image projected on the background of the eye; that color-vision is a function of the cones and rods in the retina. We have learned that stimuli of pressure, warmth, cold, and pain, applied to the skin, affect different receptory organs and travel through different nervous pathways towards different cortical areas.

It may be noted, in anticipation of later discussions, that these reasons are not purely empirical, though they are based on observable facts. But the interpretation of these facts depends, on its part, on a general assumption. It is assumed, without further inquiry, that the ability of the mind to distinguish must rest on a factual distinction of the underlying bodily processes, and vice versa, that such a distinction will furnish the mind with the necessary basis for distinguishing the appearing features. That is, a one-to-one correlation of mental states and physical processes is tacitly assumed. It may

be that such an assumption is quite legitimate. But whether or not it is must be found out by an investigation specially directed at this problem.

Insofar as this assumption is not justified expressly, it is also more speculative than empirical. One must not forget that all general theories, however well founded by experience they seem to be, depend on experience only to a certain extent. They are all the result of a syllogism, of which the major is a very general proposition. Such a theory is much more than a simple integration of facts. It is always an interpretation of facts, entailing a principle which itself may be, eventually, absolutely non-empirical.¹

3. The speculative reason may be described as the principle of elementarism. Everything, physical or mental, presenting some kind of complexity has to be understood as being constituted of elements, in themselves unchangeable and independent, which by combination or addition build up what impresses us as a complex datum.

A conception of sensation developed on the basis of elementarism is necessarily closely related to associationism. This closeness is as well a historical fact as a systematic necessity.

The historical background of these ideas cannot be discussed and, in fact, is well known. So is the fact that the ideal of conforming to the pattern of science and the hope to found a psychology as "scientific" as physics, made the notion of independent elements welcome to the fathers of modern psychology.

CONFIGURATIONALISM

Sensationism and associationism had always to cope with difficulties they never were able to overcome. It could not be satisfactorily explained, on the basis of mere mechanical principles, how directed thought ever comes to be, nor why grouping of sensations results in meaningful perceptions. The idea that the "whole might be greater than the part" lurked somehow always in the background. It came to be of decisive influence under the guidance of the new school of configurationalism ("Gestalt"). The viewpoints put forth by this school prove to be but partial manifestations of a more general trend towards "holism," which gained influence not only in psychology and biology, but in sociology too.

Without entering into a detailed evaluation of the configurationalist doctrine, one may say that it, at least, drew the attention to the interdependence of so-called sensations within the whole of a percept. One consequence flowing from the observations made on

¹ The theory of evolution may serve as an illustration. It is, of course, not here the place to discuss the merits of this theory. The only point of relevance is, that this theory is an interpretation of observed facts on the basis of the postulate that continuity is an all-pervading principle in reality.

Gestalten and the theoretical analysis of these, may be said to have revealed the possibility of a different interpretation of the relations obtaining between the "simple sensations" and the complex percept.

SIMPLE SENSATIONS AND COMPLEX PERCEPTS

The older conception was that the percept is a synthesis, or even only a sum of elementary sensations. The newer conception allows of considering the simple sensation, in those cases where such are present, as the result of a progressive simplification or destruction of percepts. The sensation, then, is no longer a true "element" of a percept; it is rather a diminished or narrowed-down percept. By simplifying the conditions or reducing the presented object, you do not arrive at any true constituent elements, but only at an unusually simple percept. The relation between sensation and percept is no longer considered as the one between element and complex, but as one between whole and fragment—not indeed as between whole and part, if the latter name is to signify a relatively independent constituent; if you blow up a building, you get, indeed, "parts," but not those which constitute organically the whole, but inorganic fragments.

This viewpoint also shows in a new light the significance of pathological findings and, generally speaking, of all observations obtained by the method of gradual reduction. It had been believed that any reduction of a complex achievement would reveal its constituent elements, whether the reduction be caused by a destructive pathological process, or brought about intentionally by limiting the complexity of the situation. German psychologists and psychiatrists spoke of *Abbau*, gradual wrecking, implying by this name that by destruction one gets back the original elements. That this may be the case is quite possible under certain conditions; that it is always the case is an unwarranted assumption.

Perhaps, it is worth while to point out that a similar situation obtains in regard to another notion, equally dear to all elementaristic psychology, that is, the notion of the "reflex." Reflexes have been viewed as constant, immutable units out of which, by combination, the complex actions result. Modern neurology and neurophysiology have shown that the reflex cannot be taken as any such unit—not only that it undergoes manifold modifications and is far from showing the constancy with which it had been credited, but that the very same stimuli which under the conditions of the experiment or of clinical analysis release a certain reflex, may have the opposite effect if the total situation of the organism makes such a response necessary.²

Thus, it seems reasonable to say that 'sensations' indeed exist; but

² For a competent analysis and criticism of the commonly held notion of

they exist only as either imperfect or reduced percepts or as inherent features, *unselbständige* aspects, of complex percepts.³

This interpretation does by no means deprive the study of sensations of its importance. Many interesting and revealing facts have been discovered and may still be discovered. The observations, insofar as they are strictly descriptions of findings, retain all their value. The theoretical implications alone become profoundly changed.

If the viewpoint indicated above is assumed, another concept of psychology is bound to take on a different meaning. The "stimulus" can no longer be considered as the simple physical agent whose impact on the sense-organ releases some elementary response to be integrated with others of like nature into the total response or behavior of the organism. The true stimulus is not the elementary physical agent but the "situation." And the situation acts on the organism, *a fortiori* on the person, not as it "objectively" is but as it appears to be or is interpreted, on the basis of previous experience, by the responding organism. Here, we find ourselves in agreement with certain modern schools, for instance, with the Naturalists, in their just emphasis of the unity of situation and responding organism. Which does not, however, amount to an acceptance of this school's basic tenets. These are, quite to the contrary, in contradiction with facts, of which a word may be said later on. But even in regard of this unity of situation and organism it has to be pointed out that it does not, as some claim, abolish the essential duality characteristic of the cognitive process. This too will become evident later.

PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

But, if sensations exist only as dependent features of complex percepts, and the instances of "pure" sensation must be regarded as reduced or fragmentary perception, what then becomes of the significance of the physiological processes so closely correlated to sensory data? All those who fervently believe in the "biological approach"

"reflex," see K. Goldstein, *The Organism* (New York, 1939), and the same author's *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940) ("William James Lectures"). Neurophysiology no longer thinks of reflexes, unconditioned and conditioned, as it did twenty years ago. It is only a certain school of psychologists who persistently cling to obsolete ideas which to abandon would be tantamount to overthrowing the very foundations of their psychological doctrines.

³ The notion that under apparently simpler conditions the true constituents or elements of a complex phenomenon must become discoverable, eventually leads to mistaken interpretations also of normal functions. I have known this to be the case in regard to certain ideas on the relations obtaining between uni- and binocular vision. The latter does not simply consist in the co-operation of the two eyes, but is in some respects an indivisible whole, of which unocular vision is not a "part" but an artificially produced "fragment." See "Über einige Unterschiede zwischen ein- und beidäugigem Sehen und über den Einfluss seelischer Momente auf einfache Leistungen des Gesichtssinns" *Sitzber. Wien. Akad.d.Wiss. Math.Ntw.Kl.* CXLIV (1935), 33.

will point out that psychological theory has not only to take account of but also to start with the facts furnished by physiology.

Whatever the merits of the biological approach be,⁴ in the case under discussion the very physiological facts have been insufficiently considered. There is, in fact, no stringent proof for the strict correlation between the two sets of facts, mental and physiological. This correlation is apparent only when, by an undue overrating of the biological aspect, the mental facts are misinterpreted and partly or altogether ignored.

It can be shown by one striking example that the ostensible parallelism of physiological and psychological states is non-existent. Consider the visual apprehension of distance or the dimension of depth. It is well known that in binocular vision the awareness of distance rests on the integration of several heterogeneous factors. There is accommodation and convergence, the disparity of the two retinal images, the acquired knowledge of size, of nearer things covering those farther away, of blurring by the slight opacities of the air, the behavior of shadows. These factors are partly non-sensory, partly however correlated to sensory processes. But the multiplicity of the underlying factors does not appear in the sensed distance; our sensory awareness of distance is a simple "sensation"; it cannot be analyzed; it does not even present, as does color, several distinguishable, though dependent features.

Another instance is the awareness of movement. The movement as apprehended is the same whether we follow the moving thing with our eyes or even with our head, or when a moving image passes over the retina. The phenomenon of movement is exactly the same in both cases. So it is also with tactually apprehended movements. *Qua* movement, there is no difference when we apprehend the movement of a thing moving across our skin, or when we follow the moving thing, keeping our finger on it.

The physiological basis is in one case in kinaesthesia, in the other in the sense of vision, or in touch alone and then in touch together with kinaesthesia. Obviously, the physiological correlates are widely different. But the "sensation" is the same.

To these modes of being aware of movement one may add the impressions of "apparent movement." This "phi-phenomenon"

⁴ I intend to deal extensively with the logical nature and the methodological right of the so-called biological approach elsewhere. Here, I only want to point out that in many instances this approach is no approach at all, but a mere transliteration into a terminology which is fondly believed to be biological, but to a large part is pure fiction, brain mythology or something similar. The explanatory value of the terms used in this "approach" is practically null; and the terms themselves mostly belong to a period of neurophysiology which is already past and whose ideas, discarded by the physiologist, manage to live on precariously in treatises on psychology.

("Wertheimer") can be observed in vision, touch, and also when the two successive stimuli are presented to different senses (A.Galli). The phenomenal datum of movement is indistinguishable from "real" movement. The underlying sensory processes are different in each of these cases and very much different from those in the case of "real" movement.⁵

This sameness of impression in spite of the great differences of the underlying physiological processes is a very important fact. Its existence however is and must be, ignored by a psychology recognizing exclusively as legitimate the "biological approach."

II

COMPARISON OF SENSES AND PROPER SENSATIONS

The interpretation of sensations, especially in their relevance for philosophy, has suffered from the fact that nearly all discussion considers primarily, or even exclusively, the data furnished by sight. Experimental psychology, to be sure, has always paid attention to the other senses too. But in any attempt to use the data of psychology, scientific or popular, for his own ends, the philosopher usually refers to vision alone. This is easy to understand; in fact, among the names taken from sensory experience and used in a more or less metaphorical sense by common language, those stemming from vision seem to be a great majority. But one cannot say a priori whether or not some characteristics discovered in visual sensations will be found also in sensations furnished by other senses, nor whether the apprehending process is here and there of the same kind.⁶

A comparative study of the various senses and the sensations they furnish is particularly important in regard to the mooted questions of the unity of sensed object and sensation on one hand, and of the true content of sensation on the other. Both these questions have bearing on problems not only of psychology, but as one easily sees of epistemology and metaphysics too. The senses, accordingly, will be briefly surveyed:

1. VISION: Under average conditions, visual data do not entail any direct knowledge of the eye being affected. Man knows that he sees by means of his eyes, not because the visual sensations carry some

⁵ It should be noted, incidentally, that the awareness of movement caused by a stimulus moving across the skin is always of the kind called "apparent." The tactual spots being separated from one another by a noticeable distance, we have in fact a discontinuous series of tactual stimuli, although the experience is of a continuous progress.

⁶ I find myself on this point in full agreement with Professor Ledger Wood, of Princeton. He writes: "Much recent epistemology is vitiated by its arbitrary restriction to sense-perception and in particular to vision. The mechanism of vision has afforded the model not only for the interpretation of perceptual cognition, but of cognition in general." *The Analysis of Knowledge* (Princeton, 1941), p. 30.

note, indicative of the participation of these sense-organs, but because of secondary experience. He has, so to speak, to discover experimentally that his eyes are the channel making him aware of color and the other visual impressions. There is no *Organgefühl* on the part of the eye. Insofar, one may call vision the most objective, the most self-effacing, or the most humble of all the senses.⁷

2. HEARING: There is, perhaps, some slight evidence for a kind of *Organgefühl*. A sound need not be very loud to create the impression of its "hitting the ear." This impression is, indeed, not strictly auditory; it results mostly, one may assume, from a sudden change in tension of the eardrum. This does not, however, make any difference, because we are concerned not with hearing as defined by sense-physiology, but with what the naïve mind comprises under this name. In spite of this faint indication of an *Organgefühl*, there is in truth no note inherent to the auditory sensation which would condition a direct knowledge of the ear's functioning as a mediator between the world of sounds and ourselves. This knowledge is mostly as secondary as it is the case with the eye.

3. TASTE AND SMELL: There is direct evidence of things being tasted by the tongue and smelled by the nose. Besides this direct knowledge, there is also a good deal of secondary knowledge, resulting from the experiences of having to draw the air up one's nose and of having to put things into the oral cavity to get their taste. Nonetheless, the localization of taste and smell is much more evident, in the data themselves, than in the case of seeing and hearing. Here too, the evidence may be to a large extent neither gustatory nor olfactive; it is conditioned by tactual and thermaesthetic impressions, as well as by the admixture of sensations of taste with those of smell and vice-versa. But these sensations are so intimately mixed with the others that we do not even know of the former. It is only by a complicated analysis that we discover, for instance, the role of non-olfactive sensations in the kind of smell called "pungent."

4. PRESSURE (OR TOUCH IN THE STRICT SENSE): This sense marks a noticeable step towards a growing preponderance of what may be called, for the present, the "subjective"⁸ side of sensation. When we touch something or something touches us we are aware of two facts; this awareness is immediate and arises simultaneously with the sensation; it is not the effect of any previous experience or

⁷ For the last expression I am indebted to a remark made in seminar of mine by Dr. James Collins, then one of my students.

⁸ The term "subjective" is not intended to suggest anything reminiscent of either idealistic or in any manner "critical" epistemology, nor as disparaging the "objective reference" on the part of sensation. These problems will be touched upon in the third section of this essay.

subsequent reflection. When a person is touched when in a completely dark room, he will inevitably exclaim: "Something has touched my hand." This statement entails a twofold knowledge, of an object touching and of the spot touched. So also, when, for instance a star-shaped object is applied with some pressure on the skin, the observer may either describe the object (very imperfectly, indeed) or the changes he realizes as produced on his skin. He may, e.g., say that his skin is depressed more in one direction than in another, and so on. But he is in no way conscious of being primarily aware of these cutaneous changes and apprehending from or by them the shape of the object.⁹ The term "local sign" has a particular signification in the field of tactual impressions; in fact, it was used there first. The "local sign" indicates the exact spot where the tactual impression occurs, but also the localization of the touching thing in space; the thing is not *somewhere*, but precisely *there* where the touched spot is. The data of the sense of pressure, thus, furnish us two aspects which coexist, but do not merge one with the other into a perfect unit; they are immediately distinguished. Their difference is a primary datum and not a secondary one, springing from experience and the reflection on, or even the automatic recalling of them.

5. THERMAESTHESIA: To the data of warmth and cold the same applies as to those of pressure. We distinguish between, e.g., the warm body which "touches" us or warmth coming "from without," in the case of radiant heat, or when, in an experiment, only one "warmth spot" is stimulated. The localization of thermic stimulation is, on the whole, as exact as the one of pressure. There is even some evidence for the existence of a certain ability to apprehend configurations by means of thermaesthesia.¹⁰

6. KINAESTHESIA: The degree in which the "subjective side" comes to the foreground in kinaesthetic experience is evidenced by the fact that it is possible to speak of a "sense of effort." The experience of effort obviously is not attached to the object making the effort necessary, but is a correlate of organismic exertion. It has also been suggested, though this idea never gained any success and was abandoned soon, that the experience of effort depends on an awareness of the intensity of nervous impulses sent out to cope with the resistance of the object ("Innervationsgefühl"). However erroneous this concep-

⁹ This summarizes part of a series of experiments I carried on many years ago. They were never published.

¹⁰ This has been shown, particularly in cases of spinal trouble in which thermaesthesia remained unimpaired whereas tactual sensibility had been abolished, in a study carried out under my direction by Francisca Halpern, *Über Raumwahrnehmung mittels des Waermesinns*, *Pflügers Arch.f.d.ges.Physiol*, CII (1924), 274.

tion be, it is a witness for the presence of a definite and immediately experienced "subjective side."

Anyone who lifts a weight can discover that there is in this experience an objective note, referring to the lifted weight, and a subjective note telling of the effort made. It has been experimentally demonstrated that the differential threshold in successive lifting is different when the subject assumes an "objective" attitude, that is, concentrates on the weight lifted, from what it is when he pays attention to the effort he makes, that is, assumes a "subjective" attitude.¹¹

A similar relation obtains between the movement we execute and the figure traced by it. It is not the same thing to realize the succession of postures which make up the movement of our limb, and the figure of which we thus become cognizant. Everyone can make sure of this by observing both sets of data when, e.g., following the contour of a table.

Under ordinary conditions, we are interested only in the objective data, or the objective knowledge founded on the data of kinaesthesia; we are then apt to forget altogether about the "subjective side." But it is there, at least in the mode of "background," and it can be brought into the focus at any moment. But we do not, of course, create the subjective aspect by turning our attention to it.

7. ALGAESTHESIA (SENSE OF PAIN): Here the subjective side becomes so much more preponderant that the objective denotation is limited, in the case of pain inflicted from without, to the simple awareness of something which hurts us. It seems that the impact from without can be realized even when the sense of pressure is not involved; if an "algic spot" is pricked, at least a faint awareness of a stimulus *ab extrinseco* seems to exist. In most cases, however, this awareness rests on the simultaneous stimulation of algic and tactual spots. It seems that the sense of pain possesses a certain amount of discriminative power, insofar as we distinguish the pain of pricking from the one caused by cutting or by diffuse painful pressure. There is, it seems, some evidence in this regard to be gained from observations on certain troubles of sensitivity occurring in cases of so-called Brown-Séquard paralysis, where on one side of the body the algic sensibility persists whereas the tactual is abolished.

¹¹ E. S. Rusdill, "Constancy of Attitude in Weight Perception," *Amer. Jour. Psychol.*, XXXVI (1925), 562. This article surveys prior studies. See also Y. Renqvist a. A. Malin, "Vergleich der Kraftempfindungen bei willkürlichen und bei elektrisch ausgelösten Armbewegungen," *Skand. Arch.f.Physiol.* LI (1927), 136. Although such a conscious differentiation of the "subjective" and the "objective" side of perception does not exist in the field of vision, there are indications of an analogical influence of "attitude" on perceptual achievements. Cf. E. Brunswik, "Distal Focussing of Perception: Size-Constancy in a Representative Sample of Situation," *Psychol.Mon.* Vol. LVI (1944), No. 254.

On the whole, however, painful sensations do not denote much, if anything at all, of objectivity. The probably greatest number of painful sensations are caused not by external stimuli, but by changes developing within the organism. Then, pain does not tell us anything about the "world outside," but only of what goes on within ourselves or within our bodies. Thus, there is a close relation between *algæsthesia* and *somaesthesia*.

8. *SOMAESTHESIA*: The sensations coming from the various parts and organs of the body may be localized, as when we feel the fatigue of a certain group of muscles, particularly exercised in some activity, or some sensation in an organ, like "heaviness" in the stomach. Of the physiological activities of the many organs we know, as common experience teaches, little; only some few of these activities are noticed at all. Some may be brought to conscious awareness, although we ordinarily do not attend to them. This is true, e.g., of the heart beat, the respiratory movements. But a slight alteration, still far from being abnormal or pathological, immediately makes us aware of the organ, as for instance of the acceleration of the heart rate in bodily work. *Somaesthesia* does not furnish us with data having an objective reference, if this term is taken as indicating the presence and the impact of some object outside of our body. But in another sense, there is in *somaesthetic* experience the same "objective reference" as in other sensations, insofar as the *sensum*, the bodily state, is distinct from the sensation which makes us aware of the former. *Somaesthesia* lacks "intentionality" no more than do the other senses.

The prevalence of the subjective side in *somaesthetic* experience is, be it said incidentally, the reason why these sensations have been confused, as also to a lesser degree those of *algæsthesia*, with emotional states. The ambiguity of the word "to feel" (and similarly also in German *fühlen*) has created many misunderstandings. I "feel" pain, hunger, cold, angry, ashamed; I also "feel" the smoothness of a surface, or the sharpness of an edge. If "to feel" has to be used only as a name of emotional awareness, all the names referring to things other than pleasantness, unpleasantness, and the more complex emotional states must be qualified as misnomers. This confusion has induced some to consider, e.g., hunger as an emotion, whereas it is a sensory awareness, a datum of *somaesthesia*. A further reason for this confusion is that *somaesthesia* tells us about modification of the body, and emotions are modifications of our self which is easily, although mistakenly, identified with the body. But we stand, if one may say so, to our body in another relation than to our self. Even if emotions have some reference to the "outside," being caused by some agent, this reference is of another nature. Emotions do not render us cognizant of any object, not even of the quasi-object which

is the body. The agent or thing to which an emotion, or even a simple feeling, refers, is known by a cognitive act, not by the emotion. Cognition, however vague, necessarily precedes emotion. The cognitive act may be linked very closely to the emotion and form with it, or even with other states too, a complex "sentiment";¹² but cognition remains nonetheless separate and distinct. Emotions can become the basis, in reflexion on them, of a particular cognition;¹³ but they are in themselves essentially non-cognitive.

To summarize: In certain sensory experiences, as for instance of touch or kinaesthesia, we are able to distinguish between the "objective" and the "subjective" side of these sensations. This distinction is immediately given; it is ascertained without effort or training. One cannot, therefore, speak in these cases of the subjective, mental or organismic process, properly called sensation, being identical with the object, called sensum. The two are clearly distinguished in the experience itself, not only by a subsequent analysis or reflexion. In other words: in the case of these sensations, at least the *id quod* is perfectly distinguishable from the *id quo*.

It is as legitimate to apply the knowledge one gathers from the study of these types of sensation to sensation in general as it is believed to be in regard to the features gleaned from observations on visual sensations. The unity of sensation and sensum, or their identity, exists only in the field of vision and, perhaps, of audition. In the other fields of sensory experience there is no unity but a definite, observable dualism.

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[*To be continued*]

¹² Alexander, Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, (2nd ed.; London, 1926).

¹³ See my article "The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions," *The Thomist*, IV (1942), 589.

PROFESSOR MARITAIN ON PHILOSOPHICAL CO-OPERATION

NEED I record my gratitude to my eminent critic for his comments, at once generous and fair-minded, on the project for co-operation between Thomists and pragmatists? Certainly he has shown up some grave difficulties that need to be realized and brought to light points that need clearing. Let me take them in order, following the text of his article in the November issue.¹

Professor Maritain says, "I am less optimistic than he about the hoped-for co-operation" (p. 1). The fact is, in respect of tangible results now or in the near future, I was and still am far from optimistic. I think the prospect for a sympathetic co-operation on the part of the "scholastic camp" is encouraging; they have given definite evidence that they want it. I don't know of any such evidence in the "pragmatist camp"; all the evidence I know of points the other way. James the starter viewed the supernatural with respect; Dewey the consummator is definitely hostile. I wrote in the article of January, 1944: "Unfortunately most of these pragmatic 'naturalists' have at present altogether too strong a bias against the supernatural to be able to experiment fairly" (p. 78). The trouble is, they don't want a reconciliation with scholasticism — or with any other type of philosophy. They believe their method is the *only* right one; all the others are wrong except insofar as they happen to coincide with the pragmatist. They believe they have refuted the main points of the Thomist philosophy once for all; fired with zeal for their own new truth, they don't want to re-examine their refutations (?) of the older view to see if some agreement might be reached. And what makes the matter worse, they persist in regarding Thomism as an authoritarian philosophy. (I have evidence of this in comments I have received.) Indeed, in view of this sad state of affairs, wouldn't it be a good thing if some Thomist scholar wrote a book with just the one aim of showing and emphasizing the scholastic's belief in free intellectual inquiry in philosophy?

¹ Professor Jacques Maritain's article, "Philosophical Co-operation and Intellectual Justice," in the November, 1944, issue (XXII, 1-15) of *The Modern Schoolman*, was written as a discussion of Dr. Sheldon's article, "Can Philosophers Co-operate?," in the January and March, 1944, issues (XXI, 71 ff., 131 ff.). —*The Editors*.

But in any case I admit——in fact I insist——that the project of harmony between philosophies is more or less a millennial one. When men give over fighting about other things——property, wages, power——they will give over fighting about their own systems of philosophy, and perhaps not till then. The strife of philosophers isn't just an affair of their little corner; it is a reflection of the whole human situation. But that, of course, releases us not a whit from the task of promoting the good cause. As Professor Maritain says, "Assuredly I do not give up the idea!" (p.1). And I cannot doubt that some day it will be achieved; how many years, how many centuries hence, who can know? Meanwhile, look at the state of affairs among us philosophers. To one who takes his stand outside of all the camps, and surveys the whole scene, the situation is really contemptible——and tragic. Contemptible to the layman, tragic to the philosopher. Philosophers blind themselves to the tragedy by hiding within their respective fortresses, looking out now and again to shell the other fortresses. They have no influence in the world of action where other men dwell, nor do they enlighten those other men with truth established. They count the least of any educated group, and they ought to count the most. If we want mankind to get a sound philosophy, we *must* put an end to this sorry spectacle; we *must* seek some means of forming a justly united front. This is a bounden duty, no less. Optimistic or pessimistic as to success, we must do it. And by every means, whether of practical action or theoretical argument. Only those who take their philosophy as a pleasant game can fail to feel this. Let me then go on to make as clear as I may the theoretical arguments, commenting on specific points raised by Dr. Maritain.

VERIFICATION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

He writes apropos of experimental verification of God's being: "The philosophical knowledge of God must tend to that higher knowledge in which divine reality is 'known as unknown' and more experienced than known, and which is peculiar to contemplative or 'mystical' wisdom (*here we are far removed from Pragmatic verification*)" (p. 2, italics mine). I venture to suggest that mystical wisdom is pragmatic verification: that is *precisely* what it is. It is direct experience, not inferential; somewhat, perhaps, as on the lower plane sense-observation by touch is immediate experience of a body, wherein the body presses against you and you sense a power in it. Contemplative it is, to be sure, though also more. The sense-analogue here might be a fusion of vision and touch, with vision corresponding to the intellectual or contemplative aspect, and touch to the force and intimacy with which the object is apprehended. What we see clearly, we see without doubt; yet touch vivifies the seen, giving new

meanings unsuspected by vision. It is, so to speak, the *realization* of the seen, the fulfilment of it in immediate contact. And what else is pragmatic verification? True, there is this difference. Mystical experience comes of Divine grace; we cannot command it, as we can reach out and touch the book we see on the table. The one verification is beyond our control, the other within it; but both are concrete direct experiences bearing out and vitalizing the knowledge we already had — — and adding new knowledge thereto.

VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS

Professor Maritain remarks, "Metaphysics is a merely speculative and intellectual knowledge." Now, not having been brought up in scholastic tradition, I have used the word metaphysics in a loose sense, to include what the Thomists call philosophy of nature as well as ontology, and what I have said about metaphysics was (so far as I remember) said in that sense. But let us speak now only of knowledge of being as being, by the intellect alone at the third level of abstraction. As Professor Maritain has elsewhere shown,² we should not have had the subject-matter from which we draw the principles of being as such, had it not been for the particular sciences which furnish the detailed facts in the temporal world; sciences which experiment and verify in the pragmatic manner. The co-operation of thought and action (experiment) at the lower level makes possible, though it does not ensure, the intellectual abstraction at the higher level. At this higher level the intellect sees what it sees, quite of itself; its X-ray (as Mgr. Sheen has put it) extracts the necessary principles that govern all being — — to which all that is, even in this changing world, must conform. To have pointed this out is the contribution of Thomism: the pragmatist with his methods would hardly have seen it. On the other hand, this pure metaphysical knowledge becomes enriched, filled so to speak with warm blood, when the metaphysician turns back to the world of changing detail and realizes the action of his principles in everything that happens there. Not that he needs it as a support for certainty any more than the mathematician needs to count out each unit when he says $2 \times 50 = 100$. But it enriches his view to see the concrete applications, not simply as additional information but as the fulfilment, the actualization of the principles. A metaphysic that stands aloof from those details does not realize to the full its own capacities, does not see the principles it has extracted *actually dominating* the world of creatures. Exemplification puts a crown on the principle. Metaphysics loves the sciences, for it sees in their experimental verification of their hypotheses the exemplification, down to the least detail, of its own truths.

² *Science and Wisdom* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), pp. 34 ff.

So metaphysics, the knowledge of being as being, not only depends for its subject-matter upon previously verified scientific truth, but welcomes that truth in turn as giving the finishing touch to its own accomplishment. Call metaphysics the higher knowledge if you like; but is not the higher at its best when it finds in the lower a completing grace? Grace, I say, not necessity. The pragmatist needs no metaphysical analysis for his verifications — they are sound enough. The metaphysician needs no experiment of his own to see that act and potency, essence and existence, are necessary traits of being. There is — should be — a degree of independence between co-operators; else each could give nothing to the other. But the point is that they can and should co-operate: in this case each contributing to the other a note that rounds out that other, in a way more fully satisfactory to man the integral person than either alone could do.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ACTION AND THOUGHT

The project of co-operation between action and thought in our philosophy really stems from the fact that we know reality at all only when action and thought themselves co-operate. Intellect *does* know being, but only when intellect has been fertilized by action. Let me explain. We come to know that there is a real world other than and independent of our minds because we find that some of our sense-data have to be respected in our acts. Try to walk through a brick wall and you find that the reddish-brown cool rough surface resists your push; to get on the other side of it you have to go round. That is why you take it to be real and not imaginary. Reality means that to which our acts, our conduct, must pay regard if we are to gain our ends. We first note it by the resistance it offers against our purposes. Later we learn that there is a great group of such *powers*, powers we cannot abolish, though they are not beyond our manipulation and re-arrangement for our own ends. In scholastic terms, reality contains *substances*, things with essential natures which act upon us and which we cannot change. It is not enough to treat these as objects of intellect, reached by abstraction from sense-data. They are indeed such, but also they are powers — their very externality to our minds is witnessed in their power over our conduct. The scholastic may easily admit this. In brief, reality must be understood in practical no less than in contemplative terms: object *of* intellect and *against* will (also *for* will when the powers of nature aid us). Thus reality (being) gets its meaning for us men when our intellect and our action co-operate. So if we would know being, we need more than *merely* speculative and intellectual knowledge. We need knowledge of what we can *do* with being (beings) and what they can do to us. Apply this now to our knowl-

edge of the Divine Being. It is not *enough* to say that He is pure being with no curtailment or exclusion. It is true, of course. It is the contribution of intellect that tells us this. But also, being is that to which we must adjust ourselves in specific ways, if we are to gain the values we need. We do not know the nature of a being unless we know, by experience—experiment, action—its specific powers. We do not know the Divine nature unless we know how to conduct our lives by it—what are its bearings on our conduct. Metaphysics spills over into ethics, or better, *means* ethics as well as ontology. See then how this applies to mystical experience. Mystical experience, richest of all in contemplative content, includes man's response to the Divine being Whom it reveals—response in very specific ways. To it God means, for example, the principle of love which, entering man's mind, becomes the impulse to behave lovingly toward all creatures. God means to the mystic, so far, the Object to which he responds in this specific way. We may see this, too, by recurring to the analogy suggested above, between mystical experience and touch. In touching a body, we are not inactive; we press it a little. But more: there is an incipient specific response on our part. From an icicle or a nettle we tend to draw away; a soft fur we tend to caress. So when the mystic, as it were, well-nigh touches Divinity, comes the well-nigh irresistible response to act as love would counsel. If God is, as we believe, intense activity at its maximum, are we not better reflections of the Divine nature when we are more intensely active? Surely the mystical experience—our highest knowledge—is not *merely* one of contemplation, though it is that, and in its fullest form. The mistake of many Hindu mystics (I don't say of all) was, I think, that they separated the contemplative state off from all active doing. They didn't try to make the world better, to recast the social order, to cure disease, etc. Surely Christianity does not include that separatist attitude—no, not even in a heaven where we no longer need to change the social order or to heal disease. Even there, we must believe, we shall be the more active and productive as we are the more like the Creator, immanently active, if you please, but still active. Create we cannot, since all we do is done by the powers that are given us. But use those powers we can—not to remove evils, but to produce more goods, ever novel forms of beauty and strength, as the mathematicians discover more and more new theorems which they have not made true, and the artists paint more and more pictures revealing hitherto undiscovered sources of thrill and loveliness, sources which they never made, things of beauty and joys forever. As Professor Maritain says of this "infused wisdom": "It may use the treasures of the imagination and of creative intuition."³ If then mystical experi-

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

ence, in what we may analogically call its touch-aspect, is both a sensing of the Divine object and an incipient response to the felt pressure exerted by that object, does it not bear witness to the pragmatic maxim that being is what it does? God the Holy Spirit is love, the source of all true human love. Could we know that, genuinely know it, unless the Divine influx provoked the response in us?

Of course, I quite agree that "when the intellectual instrument and the habit of reason are denied the power or possibility of grasping the existence of the cause of being, both God and the intellect are offended" (p. 3.) Many pragmatists, perhaps all, *have* done so. Equally, of course, my whole point was that they need not do so. I am suggesting a possible, and I hope plausible, metaphysic, not one which has been held.

TIME AND ETERNITY

I was delighted to read (p. 4) that Bergson had earlier conceived the relation between eternity and time as I have done: perhaps he didn't "insist upon this solution" later because, like most of us, he took his own type of metaphysic — — the "process" type — — to exclude all other types. But I didn't claim to give a "definition of the timeless as a time-process infinitely swift" (p. 3). I suggested only "that these timeless situations *can* be *described* in terms of process" (March, 1944, p. 133). I was talking of only one aspect of the timeless: its relation to time, not a full definition. Professor Maritain admits that my suggestion is "perhaps a helpful and somewhat illuminating" expression, but finds it "metaphorical or equivocal" (pp. 3, 4). He says that "between eternity and time, there is an insuperable difference of nature or essence" and "the notion of process could be so applied [as I applied it to eternity] only in an analogical sense and on condition that it lose any time connotation, and designate only act, and pure act" (p. 4). The "insuperable difference" of course I grant. A higher dimension is insuperably different from a lower. And our knowledge of a fourth dimension is by analogy: we pass from the third to the fourth dimension by a method analogous to that by which we pass from the second to the third. So too our notion of the Divine immutability is analogical. The point is, there is nothing in the nature of process to forbid its consistency, as there is nothing in the nature of an area to forbid the existence of a volume. Infinitely swift process is no more a self-contradiction than is a cube with plane surfaces. And the notion of such a process including *all* events in one specious present (Royce's notion) is suggested by analogy with our own brief human specious presents. I think my critic is wrong when he says "on condition that it lose any time connotation." Time has two connotations: de-

struction of the past, and fulfillment of potencies which were there all along. The former is indeed lost in the eternal present; the latter is not. Time as fulfillment is retained, for there is in the eternal no frustration of being.

Professor Maritain's doubts about the pragmatist accepting substance and finality I share; for the pragmatist does tend to interpret the behaviour of things in terms of sense-perception only. As a "naturalist" he is to all intents and purposes a materialist. (I know well that he fervently denies this.) All I say is that he need not be. His psychophobia and noetophobia are not necessary to his respect for process and verification. But I have already said that I have small expectation of convincing the present generation of this school.

In respect of verifying the hylomorphic theory, I don't understand this statement: "the entities constructed by the physico-mathematical explanation of matter involve a great deal of symbolization. They sound like *entia rationis* grounded in the nature of things rather than like ontological realities" (p. 6). Does it mean that electrons, protons, positrons, etc., aren't real as chemical atoms are? Surely Professor Maritain would not mean that. If he does, the scientific evidence is all against him. But if he does not, what is the point of his objection? Perhaps he feels that if electrons, etc., were the ultimate physical elements, chemical atoms and molecules could no longer be substances in their own right. But that does not follow. Any individual thing — atom, molecule, plant — compound or not compound, is a substance if it shows in its behaviour certain unique persistent traits, traits hanging together with power in a self-maintaining unity.

In the matter of evolution, my proposal was, I think, in line with the second kind of explanation Dr. Maritain mentions: "If now we take into account the transcendent action of the first cause, we may obviously conceive that, particularly in those formative ages when the world was in the state of its greatest plasticity, the existence-giving influx of God, passing through created beings and using them as instrumental causes, enabled — and perhaps still enables — a substantial form to act on matter . . . beyond the limits of its specificity, so that a new substantial form, specifically 'greater' or more elevated in being, is educed from the potentiality of matter thus more perfectly disposed" (pp. 6 & 7). Otherwise put: the given world-order (due to Divine fiat) is so constituted that living substances (all or some) contain within themselves the tendency or power to give rise to other substances which are fuller and more integrated — if I correctly interpret the passage quoted.

TRUTH AND VERIFICATION

And now to dig down to the root-opposition. "In the eyes of the Pragmatist truth is but one with verification. In the eyes of the

Thomist verification is only a way and a means to get hold of truth" (p. 7). And "this quarrel between Being and Becoming, and between Truth and Verification, reveals a deep-seated antagonism that the best efforts cannot overcome" (p. 8). "That is why . . . one cannot escape a feeling of precariousness, regarding the co-operation as a whole" (p. 8). Splendidly put indeed! The first statement so patently suggests the foolishness of the quarrel. If for the Thomist verification is "a way and a means to get hold of truth" he can well admit that perhaps every truth should have its verification. If for the pragmatist truth is one with verification, is not the truth for him *that which* is verified? You can't separate verification from what is verified, can you? And if not, surely then each is "one with" the other. My contention throughout has been that the mutual exclusions are *needless*. If man knows being always through verified truths about becoming (so the scholastic, with admirable empiricism, has taught) why use the disparaging "only" that scorns the "steps by which he doth ascend"? Ah, that is where the old, old human taint comes in. Each party will give the other *only* the second place. "Truth is *but* one with verification." Drop the "but" and you can admit truth one with verification, in the sense that they form an end-means unity, neither wholly meaningful or complete without the other. Are not end and means one in the final cause, even though different aspects thereof? But no! Each party must have only one ultimate, never two in partnership; or if two, then ever the one superior, the other inferior. See then why, believing this to be the root-evil, I feel that polarity will be an ingredient in the final metaphysic (a category, by the way, which permeates the Thomist system). But polarity needs very careful definition.

"To enjoy truth for the sake of truth without further ado" (p. 8) is no more incompatible with seeking practical verification of it, than is resting in the evening with a joyous sense of work done, incompatible with working through the day and looking forward to work tomorrow. Which is the greater happiness, the work or the rest? Temperaments differ on the point, and so do philosophies. But a proper life needs both, and there is no trouble for the practical man here, while the philosopher makes a contradiction out of it. So when Dr. Maritain speaks of an "antagonism that the best efforts cannot overcome," I would replace "cannot" by "probably will not for years to come." I have already said that the project in hand is millennial. But after all, our duty is to help bring about the millenium. And if the present proposals won't work, let us try to discover some others that will.

If the Thomist doesn't distinguish the needful positive message from the needless negations in pragmatism, if he reads the movement in the exclusive terms in which that movement has unfortu-

nately expressed itself, it will not help us toward a genuine synthesis. I seem to sense in Professor Maritain's words quoted above something of the old tendency to treat the opponent in his own exclusive way. And I think his estimate of pragmatism as an ethical *rather than* a metaphysical doctrine, as "deprived of all speculative and contemplative import" (p. 10), puts it in a lower grade——at least for him. Am I wrong? I devoutly hope so. He himself says, "Intellectual justice cannot be done without intellectual charity assisting" (p. 13). These words are my very text. I would but press them further and say that intellectual charity must come first——a change of heart, an eager search for positive truth, crediting to the young discoverers something we with our different perspective would never have seen, something which complements our own perennial truth with equally perennial truth. There should be no subordination here, but partnership; that is what I mean by co-operation.

CONCLUSION

In the end each "central intuition" of the respective schools is seen to contribute a truth which the other central intuitions can accept without contradiction, but which cannot be wholly derived from their own truths. Red cannot be defined in terms of blue, nor vice versa, yet both may coexist in purple. So, the central intuition of Thomism is the intelligibility of being, and that of pragmatism is (to coin a word) the actability of being——as I have tried to expound it, for example, in considering mystical experience. And both are *equally* true.

Finally as to the proposal that we begin with the easier task of attempting co-operation in practical affairs. By all means let us undertake this——in fact we have to, in respect of such matters as buying food, conducting a business, fighting a battle. Where something has to be done at once, we *must* work together. In matters involving longer-range behavior, "more philosophical problems," as Professor Maritain says, it is harder. In matters which men consider of ultimate importance——our religion and our philosophy——it is hardest of all. Certainly co-operation in the lesser is good discipline for co-operation in the greater things. Certainly we may decide to put off the attempt at the latter. I only point to the penalty of doing so. For philosophy it means the same old bickering and inefficiency as ever. Are we content to let it go on? As long as the philosopher, whether Thomist or pragmatist, idealist or materialist or what not, contents himself with the present state of affairs, so long philosophy will be justly open to ridicule and contempt. So long it will continue to forfeit its opportunity——an opportunity given to no other calling——to be the guide of life. In a democracy, where freedom of belief and conduct are a maximum, the temptation to refute and rebut

and do no more is also at a maximum. We might almost say it is the besetting sin of democracy. Let philosophy set the example of overcoming this temptation, thereby saving itself from its age-long sickness and setting a model for the world of practical men. I do not believe that philosophy has failed, while the sciences have succeeded, in producing a body of funded truth by which men may live. On the contrary, it has brought forth the great group of positive truths for which the fighting factions have respectively stood. The fields are white unto the harvest. And at the present day when its fortunes seem lowest and its influence the least, it has the greatest opportunity ever given into its hands, precisely because it has more perspectives than in any preceding age.

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SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

HISTORY TEACHES us that the days of catastrophe are not over with the end of a war, and it shows that the tribulations which follow in the wake of war stand in direct proportion to the magnitude of disaster accompanying war itself. It is very probable that we shall still have to face a severe trial after this war is over—a trial which will not permit anything to survive that does not stand upon a firm ground of its own and can be justified by sober thinking. There will be no reliance upon the preserving power of good instincts, customs, and tradition, once they are challenged by ideologies radically opposed to them.

Viewed in this respect our civilization is endangered by loss of confidence in the absolute validity of these truths, belief in which created this civilization, gave to it its essential objectives, and bound together individuals and groups in common enterprises which achieved material realization of its purposes. This loss of belief in stable truth causes even persons who are deeply concerned about the present state of universal disintegration and who sincerely seek for remedies against it to look for these remedies in the wrong direction. They pre-occupy themselves with problems of method, organization, and ways of carrying into effect, without any discussion of *what* has to be carried into effect and organized. They try to find out the best ways of teaching while they carefully avoid the question of *what* has to be taught and *what* the objectives and ends of education have to be. They blind themselves to the most obvious consequences that result from attitudes which they accept without the slightest analysis or criticism. They complain, for instance, about the passivity prevailing in politics, but they do not realize that a theoretically founded disbelief in the power of man to decide his own fate by free will and reasonable action must paralyze from the outset all human initiative and active intervention. They accept this interpretation of man's nature as the only view worthy of modern intelligence, and then repudiate, or refuse to see, its logical practical results. The fallacy is hidden deep in the unwillingness to think out the concepts either of science or of moral values.

They complain about failure in modern education but they are far from acknowledging that human education is fundamentally incompatible with yielding to natural drives, and that intellectual training and the attainment of wisdom are incompatible with making the mind

simply an apparatus for registering plain facts. They complain about the indifference, indolence, and cynicism of youth—but they do not want to see that the natural idealism which is characteristic of all youth is wilfully suppressed by parents who persuade the young to ridicule ideals as naive illusions and to consider making one's own living the only sensible task of life. They do not realize that the natural idealism of youth is suppressed by teachers who sincerely teach the young, that value judgments are unscientific because all values are a matter of subjective liking, and that there are no objective criteria of good and evil, just and unjust; that, therefore, from this point of view the conclusion is correct that the Nazis are, from their standpoint, just as right in fighting for the enslavement of all the peoples as we are from ours in fighting for freedom.

They complain about pessimism and nihilism prevailing among the poets and artists of the present time, but they do not realize that real poetry and art must be rooted in enthusiastic experiences of the overwhelming beauty of the world, and in a deep knowledge of the tragic might and dignity of human existence. These experiences, too, are ridiculed by the dominating doctrines which call them naive illusions which can have no place in the sober view of the "real state of affairs" which is to be explained wholly in physical, physiological, biological, psychological, economic, and sociological terms.

REASONS FOR REJECTION OF ABSOLUTE TRUTH

Looking for the reasons for the loss of confidence in absolute truths we find three principal explanations. *First*, modern science seems to contradict completely the natural evidences which have found their expression in the religious, moral, and metaphysical tradition of our civilization. *Secondly*, a wider knowledge of the various cultures and the shrinking size of the globe through modern communications, having rendered more visible and obvious the contrasts and diversities of the different traditions, caused many people to believe that our traditional convictions are nothing but provincialism, and that we should accept a more global and pluralistic view. *Thirdly*, the conflict among nations, states, races, and classes which today threatens mankind with self-destruction makes it advisable to remove its causes by an international emphasis on *tolerance*. This term, however, by many people is taken to mean that we should not insist upon holding our own convictions to be absolutely true and the contrary ones of our opponents to be absolutely false. Rather we say: "It may be that they are right and we are wrong, or both are wrong, or the truth lies in a compromise." Any absolute conviction in beliefs and evaluations, in the view of many people, seems to smack of too much similarity with totalitarian conformity and an authoritarian standardization of

minds. It seems to be intolerant, despotic, and unenlightened really to believe that anything is true and right. If education and re-education are to have any firm base at all it is the first task of thought to show that these views are wrong.

CRITIQUE OF THESE REASONS

First, as to modern science, it has become more and more obvious that this discipline does not give us knowledge in the natural meaning, i.e., knowing something which exists objectively and actually. All the obvious contradictions by modern science of the evidences apparent to the common man and of those of our religious, moral, and metaphysical tradition have their source in the fact that modern science has no concern with recognizing what exists, but seeks only to provide an effective technique for subjecting nature to man. All the tensions between modern science and the evidence of our common experience and the truth of our traditions originate in a confusion of modern science with real knowledge. It is this mistake which has caused modern thinkers to try to force completely pragmatic and utilitarian categories upon truth, ethics, and justice, and to deny the fundamental necessity of the contemplative attitude to knowledge. Not a single fact has been "discovered" by modern science which really contradicts the religious and moral experience and the conviction of our tradition; it is only the misinterpretation of facts that refutes religion, ethics, and metaphysics.

Secondly, as to the diversities among cultures, it can be demonstrated that cultural differences in religion, ethics, justice, philosophy, and aesthetic taste are only the result of the adjustment of basically identical truths and values to different objectively existing conditions for their expression. It is only a superficial view which revels in the diversities and contradictions of different cultures, whereas a wider knowledge and a deeper understanding reveals more and more clearly the identical core which underlies the differences.

Thirdly, there is nothing more patently relativistic than the view that the absolute validity of truth, ethics, justice, etc., means a belief that can be ordered and forced upon people to make them accept it. Only he who has no real faith and no conviction of any objective truth can believe that it is possible to force religion, morality, and definite philosophies upon other peoples by coercion. True believers, like Roger Williams, insist upon tolerance because they know that freedom of conscience and freedom of will are the essential prerequisites of religious faith and moral action. Jefferson fought for freedom of investigation because he knew that real knowledge could be acquired only through free insight. He favored free discussion because he was

confident in the power of objectively valid truth to defeat falsehood by sheer evidence. It is fundamental that no real authority in spiritual matters can be established by force.

EDUCATION AND PHILOSOPHY

Modern education is based upon wrong philosophical assumptions. First of all in importance is the denial of the essential dualism of man, existing between his spiritual person and his psycho-physical nature. The denial implies that it is impossible for man to act against his own natural impulses and instincts, and to act freely, motivated by Reason. As a consequence of this view, modern education appeals to self-interest and ambition, favoring rather than suppressing childish vanity and competition. It wants to make us believe that the antagonistic behavior of various individuals acting under these motives will, through some mystical transformation, result in peace and harmonious benefit for the good of the community.

The same philosophies which deny the power of reason and spiritual values to control natural impulses and to determine human behavior, cause modern education to yield to every capricious desire of children, wholly neglecting their nature and true destiny as spiritual beings. It is the same situation that we have in politics where, under the influence of the same philosophies, people stick to the obsolete view that economics and "power" are the only real factors upon which a reliable politics can be based, while Reason is considered to be powerless, and freedom, justice, everlasting peace, and brotherhood are nothing but nice fancies never to be taken seriously. Just as the dictators of ancient Rome yielded to the cry of the people—Bread and Circuses—modern education yields to the most elementary, undisciplined drives of youth. Instead of being educated to become mature and responsible citizens, the Roman *plebs* was spoiled by the flattery and easy satisfaction of its most primitive desires; in this way it remained immature. And today, instead of supporting the deeper longing of youth for truth and justice, its enthusiastic idealism is diverted and forced to exhaust itself in senseless "activities" and in excesses of sex, play, swing, and stimulants. "No real thinking—it is too abstract." "No real mental effort—unless it is of practical use." "No restrictions in favor of higher ends—but complete spending of one's vital power—just for fun." Real human education has been so completely rejected that the central meaning of education has been lost; one calls education that which is nothing but training in skills needed for a job in order to get money and a position.

Those who in former times fled to America from countries in which their religious or political freedom was threatened did so for the most part because they refused to adjust themselves to the situa-

tion in their homeland; they left behind them an easy life and security and undertook the hardship of a pioneer life in this country. It was these idealists who became the real founders of a nation on new free ground. And they became the builders of America just because they preferred to shape reality according to ideas rather than to compromise with facts. They bore in mind something higher and better than the given reality.

THE NECESSITY OF IDEALS

This was the idea underlying education not so long ago. It presented to the mind of youth models of absolute perfection, the realization of which was impossible for human beings. It is in the essential nature of such ideals that they contradict the experience of real facts. Many modern educators misunderstood this essential contradiction between the ideal and the real; they claimed that it disproved the validity of the ideals and hence they tried to replace ideals by teaching children to recognize men and the world as they really are in crude, existing fact.

But see what follows when ideals are replaced by this so-called realism: children are nourished according to the point of view of disappointed and aged men. Every natural impulse of youth for higher things is suffocated by a perverse cynicism. Not only are the children robbed of their youth in this way, but also of their manhood. For one does not become an adult without going through the experience of finding out that contradictions prevail between real life and those natural ideals of youth which modern education tries to exclude. Manliness can only be acquired through the struggles which occur when a child comes into conflict with the real world. The transition from childhood to real manhood does not happen continuously and easily, but by very painful breaks in which adult tenacity and strength develop together. People who never experience these conflicts (because they never had ideals which contradicted the real world) remain in an infantile state, even in their adult years. In his *Babbitt*, Sinclair Lewis presented such a boneless type, lacking all independence in his way of living and of thinking. He enjoys a shallow optimism; for, since he does not expect to get anything higher out of life, he can never be disappointed.

If you always talk to children about the evil in the real world, warning them to keep their "feet on the ground rather than to flee from the world's difficulties into some fantasy, into a romantic idealism, concocted out of impossible expectations, superstitions, and fear,"¹ then you rob them of that energy and *élan* which they need in order to overcome those difficulties. And you increase those difficulties. For children exaggerate a behavior which they are taught to look on

¹ I quote E. Thorndyke.

as the decisive factor in the world. They force themselves to become what some theories are teaching them to be—beasts. And they suppress that real principle in themselves that they were taught did not exist—spirituality.

Young people who lack any higher ideal as an aim of life are bound to become the easy prey of the baser instincts. They waste their time in senseless activity. They feel this senselessness and remain dissatisfied. Failing to understand spiritual aims, they can only be incited by a striking show of crude and dominant power. They therefore become admirers of violent adventurers.

Spiritual aims, even though overemphasized, offer a counterweight against all the temptations to abuse of power in wartime. Without that counterweight youth becomes unable to resist the temptations of brutal force. Consequently, the more that force governs the real world at any time, the more youth should be educated in an idealistic manner.

EDUCATION AND PRACTICAL BEHAVIOR

And the question arises, whether realistic and practical behavior can be taught at all in schools. Like swimming that can only be taught in water, so practical behavior, too, can only be acquired in the actual meeting with practical affairs in real life, and not in schools. Teaching theoretically how to behave practically, is self-contradictory. Even among the famous men of business and science who successfully managed practical jobs, like Rockefeller, Carnegie, Morgan, Edison, Marconi, there is not a single one who was prepared for his job by theoretical learning.²

There is only one thing education can do in preparing children for practical life: to develop and train some of the general human abilities and virtues which man must have in order to succeed anywhere—such abilities and virtues as exact observation, clear, sharp, and independent thinking, perseverance, thoroughness, etc.

One cannot educate any person by taking the aims of education from what that person already is and wants, but only by leading him

² The effectiveness and inventiveness of the Germans are beyond doubt. Paradoxically enough, they are the result of a highly abstract and impractical thinking, schooled in the spirit of the German speculative philosophy and culminating in scientific detachedness from practical interests. This detachedness—"Sachlichkeit"—has cultivated in many German scholars an inhuman attitude toward man and real life and has made them a curse rather than a blessing. But the only safe precautions in the post-war world against German efficiency and inventiveness used for bad purposes will be more efficiency and greater inventiveness on the part of the United Nations; we shall, therefore, have to cultivate in our education speculative thinking and "Sachlichkeit," too—but we must combine them with the preservation of a humane attitude.

³ And one cannot develop *all* his natural tendencies and talents, since some of them are bad and some can be developed only at the expense of others; a definite choice has to be made among the various talents of a person.

to something which he is not yet, and which he has not been able to define in his present stage of development as his own aims and objectives.³ The easy natural inclinations must be opposed if adults are to be made out of children.

RE-EDUCATION—A RETURN TO REASON AND SPIRIT

Misled by wrong philosophies which, from their instrumentalistic point of view, repudiate the true evidences of reality and spiritual values, modern education has resulted in infantilism. And again, misled by wrong philosophies which derive what makes man a human being from subhuman drives and material circumstances, the confidence in spiritual authority and intellectual leadership has been lost in favor of a voluntary submission to brutal force and stupidity. It is necessary to realize the following very simple connection: the intellectuals themselves, with their all-undermining scepticism, subjectivism, and relativism, have deprived Mind and Spirit of any influence on human affairs. The intellectuals—and not the common man, not youth nor the businessman—are the genuine materialists of the present time. There will be no re-education unless the confidence in Reason and Spirit is re-established. And to do this is the task of studies which must be carried on within the framework of thinking which is devoted to research into the evidence for and defining of human *ends*. To overcome the instrumentalistic or utilitarian view is the foremost task of today.

We have to give reasonable meaning to all the practical achievements which we already possess. Even politicians and economists begin to realize that we have to shift our mental energies from occupation with the problems of production to those of consumption. In accordance with this necessity, it is crucial that we should stop educating ourselves and our children in terms of adjustment to tools; instead we have to start the education of *men as ends in themselves*, that is, the education of *free* men. And this is exactly what *liberal education* means.

MAXIMILIAN BECK

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EDITORIAL

OUR SERIES, *Can Philosophers Coöperate?* finds its culmination in the present issue. We are grateful to the two contributors for their masterly explorations of the possibilities of co-operation and we believe they have greatly promoted the desired *rapprochement*. So clearly have the main obstacles been brought to light and so judiciously have the means of overcoming them or circumventing them been suggested that we do not intend here to enter the lists as a third party. It is rather our desire to perform the rôle of interpreter or liaison officer between the contributors and our readers.

Doctor Sheldon suggests that there is an ultimate philosophy, or at any rate there are some ultimate principles, which both the opposing schools do, at least by implication, accept. But what is explicit in the one is only implicit in the other. The Pragmatist implicitly accepts the principle of sufficient reason, the Scholastic explicitly. The Pragmatist explicitly accepts the principle of verification by experiment, the Scholastic implicitly. Yet each has his own way of accepting a principle. The Pragmatist is prepared to accept the principle so long as it *works*, if it fails to work he will abandon it. The Scholastic, in common with the Pragmatist, derives a principle from experience but formulates it in such a way that he is sure it will continue to work without fail. Antithetical as these two attitudes appear, Doctor Sheldon maintains that they do not exclude co-operation.

Doctor Maritain is skeptical about there being any basic philosophy or principle which the two schools accept either explicitly or implicitly. He concedes that on the level of common civic life and honorable human conduct—though the reasons for such be widely different—co-operation is not only possible but necessary. But on the level of the ultimate reasons, the metaphysical level, he can see little or no prospect of agreement. The Pragmatist operates in the perceptible or phenomenal world, the Scholastic metaphysician penetrates through that world to a reality denominated “being” or substance, from which phenomena have their origin and their laws. The reason why the two cannot meet is because they are on different floors. The best they can do is for each to observe what the other does to see what he can learn for the improvement of his *own* system.

To sum up the work of our two contributors, with some degree of approximation, Doctor Sheldon suggests that there must be some-

thing which, as is said in diplomatic circles, can be accepted in principle by both parties. Professor Maritain, leaning toward a realistic diplomacy, proposes a *modus vivendi* which will make peace possible and co-operation effective in the realm of human living without demanding that either party abandon a conviction which is its only reason for existence.

Are the two contributors brought into closer harmony by the article in the present issue? Can intuition be a formula or a working hypothesis to bring Pragmatist and Scholastic together? Readers who feel that it is the duty of philosophers to co-operate are invited to inform us of their reaction to the series. Others, if any, who think that we were only stirring up more discord, or pursuing a forlorn hope, will probably not have read the series through. But if they have read this Editorial Note through, we should likewise be grateful for their comments.

J. A. McW.

BOOK REVIEW

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL *edited by Paul A. Schilpp.*
The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume 5. Northwestern
University, 1944. Pp. xv+815. \$4.00.

The present study on Bertrand Russell follows the same general plan employed by The Library of Living Philosophers in presenting the philosophy of Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, and Moore. An autobiographical essay, "My Mental Development," is followed by twenty-one essays by eminent students, on various phases of Russell's thought; Russell offers a brief reply to his critics, and the volume is rounded out with a bibliography of his writings and a useful index. Because of Russell's masterful prose and widely publicized unorthodox stand upon many practical moral issues, his name is probably better known to the general reader than that of any other contemporary philosopher. Yet this is no guarantee that his philosophical doctrines, especially on theoretical matters, have had the same widespread currency. This symposium helps to right the balance by explaining and criticizing his views on logic, scientific method, theory of knowledge, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, religion, political and social philosophy, and the philosophy of history. The wide range of subjects upon which he has written, together with the recognized importance and originality of his investigations in mathematics and symbolic logic, justifies Russell's inclusion in the series being edited by Dr. Schilpp. No student can understand the trend of present-day thought without a careful consideration of his teaching and its influence.

So many and grave are the problems raised by this volume, that it will be more profitable to indicate a few of these than to attempt a formal summary of the content of the more significant essays.

THE CARTESIAN APPROACH

The philosophizing of each age is set in its own characteristic key, and Russell's philosophical mood is authentically representative of our times. In the midst of acknowledged doubt and basic challenges he has sought truth that is certain, without allowing himself consciously to be stampeded into an easy dogmatism of whatever sort that dismisses honesty and shaded assents. Whatever our judgment concerning the soundness of his reasoning, we are not left wondering whether he is affirming more than he now sees. And in the sphere of practical thinking, Russell's constant solicitude for freedom is such that those who are most impressed with the magnitude of the forces threatening it can take some hope from his example if not from the safeguards and solutions he proposes. A thirst for truth and freedom has always animated the genuine philosopher, but in Bertrand Russell these aims take a peculiar form which men of our day can best appreciate. The Cartesian approach to human problems is marked by a quest for certitude of a mathematical sort through the extension of methodic doubt to all philosophical fields, and by a set of solutions which achieves systematic coherence by its thorough-going dualism. Without ever

forgetting his background in the English empirical tradition and his great debt to Hume, Russell is in certain fundamental respects the heir of Descartes and his manner of treating ultimate questions from the standpoint of the knowing subject. This twofold heritage of Descartes and Hume enables Russell to take his place in the main stream of contemporary thought without being troubled by that partially alien and critical attitude inescapable for more traditional minds. Yet he is not comfortably and serenely installed there, for he is keenly aware of the difficulties and paradoxes attendant upon his attempt to account for things rationally without falling into one or another tempting excess. His critics are also aware of these tensions arising from the situation of a philosopher today.

In a way Russell is a mathematician who has wandered into the field of philosophy, for he tells us that he "came to philosophy through mathematics or rather through the wish to find some reason to believe in the truth of mathematics" (qu. p. 59, n. 10). The certainty, economy, and scientific rigor of mathematical thinking have provided him with an ideal to be applied as well to the philosophical disciplines. The extensive ramifications of the method of analysis throughout his system and the manner in which mathematical requirements led him to shift from absolute idealism to dualism have been admirably traced in detail by M. Weitz. This same method has been severely criticized by H. Chapman and J. Boodin. Against the monadistic and monistic idealism of Leibniz and Hegel, Russell has offered several permanently valuable arguments which refute the theory of the complete internality of relations. In this he has followed Moore and the American realists. Certain consequences entailed by his general position, however, presented serious difficulties which forced him later to make an uneasy and incomplete shift to a modified version of neutral monism. When the notion of the soul as the act of organized matter is obscured and distorted by imagination, it is not philosophical fashion alone but chiefly the changed nature of the available concepts which dictates that the problem of man and of the world in general be framed as the mind-matter problem. The kind of dualism that offers itself here as an alternative to some form of monism shares little in common with the Aristotelian theory of matter and form as applied to man and to the physical universe. Hence the use of the term "dualism"—by L. Mercier, among others, in his admirable discussions on humanism—to characterize the traditional position is apt to be misleading. A mind-matter dualism is inadequate to the task of accounting for the oneness of the human person, and is even less satisfactory when erected into a general cosmology.

NEUTRAL MONISM

Special factors were at work to hasten Russell's rejection of this view. One of these was his distaste for the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*, with which he forthwith identified substance: in rejecting the former notion, he felt free to disregard every theory of substance. This provincialism is at least understandable when we recall the caricature of substance as an inert core which proved so easy a target for Hume. Reducing matter to a set of logical properties and mind to consciousness and acquaintance, little more was needed to embrace the theory of a neutral mind stuff being popularized by James, Mach, and the American realists. That little more was supplied (to the historian of philosophy, significantly) by the principle of parsimony, endowed beforehand with monistic overtones. "That the things given in experience should be of two fundamentally different kinds, mental and

physical, is far less satisfactory to our intellectual desires than that the dualism should be merely apparent and superficial" (qu. p. 71). Russell is not alone in holding this prejudice, for the sonorous contrast between monistic profundity and the superficial reading of those who prize the variety of things in their piebaldness remains with many empiricist thinkers even after they have presumably put idealism to rout. As W. Stace remarks in his study on Russell's neutral monism, there is no special philosophical virtue attaching to the rule of making out as few as possible kinds of things in the world, if possible only one. The intellect does tend to the unity of being, but to a unity which is as supple and diversified as being itself. It shrinks at least as much from slurring over great differences in kind as from clumsily ignoring fine nuances within a single order. Russell himself could never embrace absolute monism, since he could never deny the presence of purely subjective images and completely unperceived aspects of the physical world. Hence he admits in this volume that "there is no rational objection to dualism" (p. 710).

EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

The first task today is not to ask directly what is presented by the evidence, but rather what sort of findings are to be credited as evidence. A method that functions successfully in one discipline is not always capable of being transferred univocally to another sphere. The ideal of a minimum vocabulary was basic to the advances Russell made in mathematical logic, but the validity of applying the reductive approach to wider problems in philosophy is not beyond all discussion. It is not at once apparent, for instance, that because we do not experience the self in isolation from one or other of its acts, it is *therefore* non-existent. Boodin, in his essay on Russell's metaphysics, quotes Lotze to the effect that "a thing is what it does," and if allowance be made for the special sense of this remark in the Lotzean system, we still can detect there an echo of the axiom: *operari sequitur esse*, which is a keystone of Thomistic anthropology. The self precisely is manifested in, but not exhausted by, its particular acts; to set up impossible isolating conditions for its presence to the mind is to be guilty of what R. Allers elsewhere justly terms the elementarist fallacy. This same danger is also present in investigating the foundations of knowledge, for the discrete results of atomic analysis (what P. Wiener calls "absolute logical beginnings" obtained by methodic doubt), while logically primitive, are not psychologically primary or directly equivalent to the metaphysical structure of the real. For the latter is not an overlaid pattern of formalized "worlds" or logical constructions. This is not to deny an epistemological order, and on this question I would certainly side with Russell against Dewey. But it is a cautioning against confusing the epistemological order with the metaphysical, against identifying the ultimate results of reductive analysis with the actual groundwork of the world.

On certain important issues—and often in opposition to other contributors in this volume—Russell approaches the position of the perennial philosophy. He champions the truth-property of propositions, the principle of excluded middle, the generality of thought and the irreducibility of at least the note of the "similar" in universals, the need for and validity of inferred truth, and the availability of basic propositions immediately given in sense acquaintance. To be effective, however, his critique of complete empiricism and logical positivism requires that the scope of the immediately given be considerably widened. Russell is prevented from giving a

decisive account of universals by his fear that a distinction between intellectual and sense reports will involve him again in dichotomous dualism or even in a mechanistically-construed faculty theory. This apprehension cannot be removed by fervent profession but only by a careful examination of the epistemological relation between mediate inferential knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance, and by showing that some differentiating principle must account for generality and for the peculiar arrangement which Russell terms the mental order. A step in this direction is taken by R. Chisholm, who quotes C. I. Lewis and J. Wild as maintaining that what is given is not the thin surface of analytically isolated sensory aspects, but the actual world of things which comes in thick or integral experience and of which sensation is an intentional means. Were the essential distinction between sense and intellectual knowledge carried through consequentially by Russell, a way would be available to overcome logical atomism, to understand the significance of the "similar," and to locate a stable position which avoids both nominalism and extreme realism (with which he unfortunately identifies every variety of medieval realism). Here a service could have been performed by a student like T. Greenwood, who is familiar with the traditional teachings on mathematics and logic as well as with more recent developments. And the entire discussion about cognition, percepts, the brain, and events would have benefited by comment from the standpoint of an intentional theory of knowledge that avoids the fantasies of Meinong, the idealism of Husserl, and the ultimate materialism of the neutral monists.

PHILOSOPHY AND MORALITY

While Russell has had few kind words for Kant, he does accept uncritically that absolute chasm between speculative and practical reason which all Kant's efforts failed to bridge. He disavows any connection between his theory of being and his theory of doing, or rather, he denies that the realm of value judgments contains truth or is strictly philosophical at all. It is not sufficient to register the fact that there is an element of universality in every moral judgment, at least a desire to arouse the same conviction in all men. Granting a difference in the formal standpoint and persuasive methods employed in theoretical and practical philosophy, this admitted universality implies a public and theoretically ascertainable zone which would permit common insight into the meaning of the good and reasonable agreement upon the ways to attain it. The special relevance of character and general training of the will and affective factors for insuring sound moral judgment is part of our Western heritage, but equally a part of this tradition is the assurance that unanimity in the order of action among free men can be approached on the ground of a true order of goods that is rationally apprehended, and that a general attitude on the nature of reality in its structural aspect has the profoundest effect upon a man's conception of his practical place, task, and goal within the world. Hence duty is also stressed in common ethical thought and practical life not as inculcated solely by sentiment, social pressure, need, and clever propaganda, but by a common moral law intelligently recognized as present in a commonly shared and constant human nature. The moral disapproval which Russell allows when an impasse has been reached includes a note of blame because a course was not followed which the other person could and should have seen to be good, as well as a judgment passed objectively upon the other's alternative plan.

Controversy upon moral matters, as J. Buchler remarks, implies that a certain minimum system of reference and a core of intellectual motivation are admitted commonly. Certainly, consequential monism scarcely survives this dichotomizing of science and value, while the problem of harmonizing and integrating practical views with the theoretical outlook is set aside as insoluble in principle.

FREEDOM AND RELIGION

On particular points, Russell is refreshingly sound in refusing to place his entire faith in social planning, scientific control, V. McGill's Marxian materialism, or nationalism of any brand. In his concern for human freedom, which is being threatened by the emphasis placed upon man as a citizen in our own society as well as in totalitarianism, he sees no hopeful counter-force "except the old religious emphasis upon the individual, which is an essential part of both Christianity and Buddhism" (p. 733). In his reply to E. S. Brightman's analysis of his philosophy of religion, Russell states that while he rejects most theologies and the churches, he does consider some form of personal religion highly desirable. Yet he is not content with Brightman's appeal to religious experience and the implicit promptings of the heart as an indication of God's existence, observing that he prefers the scholastic proofs, which at least profess to be strict proofs, even though he considers them erroneous. Moreover, Russell admits that he knows no convincing proof against God's existence, not even the presence of evil in the world. Brightman's own finite developing God makes little headway against this agnosticism. Once again we miss the treatment of Russell's position which could have been offered by a representative of that Aristotelian-Scholastic natural theology whose rational procedure and affirmation of a transcendent God are more akin to his own conception of what philosophical bases a true religion should provide (I am thinking, for instance, of such an essay as that by E. I. Watkin on Russell's religious views in his *Men and Tendencies*).

Several of the contributors deprecated what one of them termed Russell's regret for the passing of the monkish ideal of contemplation, but there were only one or two who recognized the essential place contemplation should occupy in personal life and in society. It is not escapism but a philosophically (and theologically) inescapable conclusion that man must seek for the truths of eternity as well as those of time, that his spirit should aspire to a state of active possession of the stable good he longs for as well as a constant pursuit of what is by its nature evanescent. This orientation to a transcendent order of permanent reality is strongly ingrained in Bertrand Russell, and yet he doubts whether this eternal world is anything more than a product of his imagining, the projection of a desire for which logically there need be no actual counterpart. He is left sceptically poised between what he would like to believe were only his inner promptings true, and what he thinks he can alone affirm upon philosophical evidence. At least this attitude indicates that in practice he is not inclined to abandon theoretical considerations about truth even in the order of value judgments.

Thus Russell is not to be beguiled by religious humanism, for he insists that any satisfactory religious goal must be above and beyond mankind, and even that it must somehow be "a gradual incarnation, a bringing into our human existence of something eternal" (qu. p. 533). In a far-off manner he seeks a God truly transcendent and truly immanent. But this end is characterized as something impersonal, leading Russell to place

more weight upon the mathematical-logical system of truths that this system will bear. For the latter cannot become a substitute for religion without reintroducing a Platonic ultra-realism which is ineffective for treating the world as given and for offering a reality worthy of a human person's worship and sacrifice. It seems to me that the philosophical trend in America will be not in the direction of Russell's version of "a free man's worship," but rather along the lines suggested by Buchler, who advocates a translation of the content of traditional religious concepts into a naturalistic context. If this project can avoid the extravagances of the French Revolution, Comte, and C. F. Potter, and can somehow cease to be esoteric and incapable of communal expression, it will prove a far more formidable rival to Christianity than any proposal of Russell's has been. Naturalism may well be attempting to extend "soft" materialism from psychology to a positive philosophy of religion, and so to attract men by its comprehensiveness rather than by its negations.

My concluding remark concerns the editorial policy of this work, not so much what it contains as what it omits. While almost every other shade of philosophical opinion has been given a voice here, no representative of the Aristotelian-Scholastic school has been allowed to evaluate some phase of Russell's thought from that standpoint. This runs contrary both to the growing fairness of most co-operative philosophical enterprises in this country and to the balanced aim of the present critique of Russell. Here is a clear instance in which separatism and the refusal to admit the reasonably stated appraisal of an important sector of American philosophical thought cannot be charged to the Scholastics. An observation of this sort would, of course, be futile in the case of a single work already published, but since this book is one of a carefully planned series, it is hoped that this lacuna will be filled in succeeding volumes. If one or more contemporary exponents of *philosophia perennis* will presumably be included in a study of Gilson's philosophy, there is no valid reason why the valuable contributions these thinkers can make to the understanding and criticism of Croce, Cassirer, and Heidegger should not also be welcomed.

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BOOK NOTES

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION: PHILOSOPHY IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION. Vol. XIX, 1943. Pp. 200. \$2.00.

This nineteenth volume of the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, as the subtitle indicates, is very opportunely devoted to a discussion of Catholic Philosophy in the post war reconstruction. Both the formal papers and the round table discussions are directed to this end.

The papers form a very complete whole and treat of all the important phases of the role of Catholic philosophy as a firm foundation for the peaceful reconstruction of civilization. Individually these papers are excellent, vital and important contributions to contemporary Catholic philosophical thought, its method and application to the outstanding questions of the day. They are provocative of thought and a challenge to all Scholastic thinkers.

Included in the list of subjects treated are: "A Philosophy of the Absolute and Permanent Peace," by Most Reverend Samuel A. Stritch; "The Natural Law, the Basis of International Law," by Arthur A. Kelly; "Some Moral Problems of a Victorious Army of Occupation," by Bernard McMahon; "International Co-operation in Philosophy," by Vernon J. Bourke; "Personalism and the Problem of the Individual in the State," by John A. O'Brien; "The Christian Concept of Law in the Post-War World," by Thomas J. Reilly; "Catholicism and Modern Liberalism," by Ralph Barton Perry; and "A Philosophy of Education for the Post-War World," by John J. Wright. Probably the central and most important of the papers is the one by Anton C. Pegis, "Toward the Rediscovery of Man." This is an exceptionally good piece of work; it is the principle of unity in the discussion, enunciating as it does the very first principles upon which post-war reconstruction must be built.

The convention, held December 29th and 30th, 1943, of which these are the proceedings, was dedicated to the memory of the Reverend John F. McCormick, S.J. Gerard Smith, by way of introduction to the volume, has given us a sincere and glowing tribute of the man who devoted his life so unsparingly to the teaching of Catholic philosophy and who is known and loved by so many of his American contemporaries.

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THE TRACTATUS DE SUCCESIVIS, ATTRIBUTED TO WILLIAM OCKHAM edited with a Study on the Life and Works of Ockham by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (Franciscan Institute Publications, no. I). *The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure College*, 1944. Pp. xi + 122. \$2.00.

In 1930, Dean Richard P. McKeon wrote. "William of Ockham presents the spectacle... of a philosopher, generally conceded to be of the first

importance, whose reputation would seem undiminished by the fact that none of his logical, physical or philosophical works have been published since the seventeenth century." (*Selections from Med. Philosophers*, II, 351.) If something has been done in the ensuing fifteen years to remedy this situation, much of the credit must be given to Father P. Boehner. His enthusiasm and scholarship have been given, very largely, to the difficult task of discovering the truth about one of the most enigmatic personalities of the fourteenth century. The present work is a stepping-stone toward an eventual, definitive edition and study of Ockham. Only then will it be possible to determine his relations to the Nominalistic movement which bears his name.

With characteristic modesty, Father Boehner apologizes for devoting some twenty-three pages of his "Introduction" to biography and bibliography. That William was probably born twenty years before the conventional date (c. 1300), that he is not called G. de Ockham in the MSS but simply G. Ockham (hence, that Ockham *may not* be a place name), that he had studied the liberal arts before 1310, theology 1310-1315, lectured on the Bible 1315-1317, on the *Sentences* 1317-1319, was a *Baccalaureus formatus* 1319-1323 and, apparently, was granted his doctorate in theology in 1323—these are some of the precisions suggested. The title, *Venerabilis Inceptor*, is explained as referring to his having delivered his first lecture as a *magister* (his *principium*) and not at all as referring to his supposed initiation of the Nominalistic school. Many interesting details about Ockham's troubles at Avignon, his part in the schism of the Franciscan Order and his life at Munich are reviewed. Father Boehner considers it probable that Ockham died in reconciliation with his Church.

The treatise edited in the ensuing pages is made up of three parts: *De motu*, *De loco*, *De tempore*. It is found in four complete MSS, all of which are used as the basis for the present edition. Moreover, it is well established by the editor that these parts are literal excerpts from Ockham's *Expositio super libros Physicorum*, a work unedited as yet but regarded as quite authentic. This means that the present *Tractatus* is one of those compilations made by busy people in the late Middle Ages and attributed, as if a new work, to a well-known author. The text is quite readable and could be of great value for at least three purposes: (i) as a check on the edition of the *Expositio super lib. Phys.*, which it is hoped Father Boehner may be enabled to do; (ii) as the present basis for the study of Ockham's views on the philosophy of nature (for the text is authentic in the sense that it was written by William, but not as a separate treatise); and (iii) for the investigation of the School of Ockham in the fourteenth century.

This is the kind of work which all mediaevalists and students of philosophy will welcome and, perhaps, try to emulate. Modesty, care, precision, understanding and scholarly prudence are the virtues of the good editor; they are well illustrated here. The Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure's College is to be commended for the quality of its initial research publication.

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THE NEW TESTAMENT IN ENGLISH *translated by* Ronald A. Knox.
Sheed & Ward, 1944. Pp. 573. \$3.00.

It is a little too early to give a critical estimate of Monsignor Knox's *The New Testament in English*, but even a cursory reading convinces one that at last the long-expected break with the Douay Version has been accom-

published by a competent scholar. What we want is a modernization, not of the Douay Version, but of the authentic message of the Bible. This new rendering of the New Testament aims at being clear and illuminating. The words are those we ourselves are using in everyday speech. I have no doubt that this new translation will find many friends. The general make-up of this important work is pleasing; but it is to be regretted that the author has altogether dispensed with quotation marks. The eye has nothing to tell one where a speech ends and the narrative is resumed.

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MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES by Louis Wasserman. *The New Home Library*, 1944. Pp. viii+287. \$0.69.

The contents of this book fall very far short of justifying the title. There is little in it that deserves to be called political philosophy. A note on the frontispiece states that parts of this book were formerly published as *The Handbook of Political Isms*. The former title should have been retained. At best it is a handbook or glossary which attempts to give a brief sketch of the aims and ideals—but not the philosophy—of such movements as Democracy, Liberalism, Capitalism, Marxism, Socialism, Soviet Communism, Anarchism, Syndicalism, and so forth. Its reading cannot do anybody any harm, although it is unlikely that anyone except a novice will care to read it. The college freshman who has never before heard of Fabian Socialism or Henry George's single tax program can find here a clear but scanty description of their main tenets. Anyone else will find the book superficial. The author's description of Democracy and Liberalism is especially defective. He evidently has no suspicion that the contradictory perplexities of Liberalism are rooted in its philosophical inadequacies and fallacies. The other sections of the book, while superficial, have the merit of clarity. They are, however, merely descriptive. In his introduction the author states that "... what was at first intended . . . as a mere glossary of terms has now grown into a full-fledged primer of social doctrines . . ." Since he himself regards his book as no more than a primer it would be unfair to find too much fault with its lack of substance. As a primer it possibly does fulfill its purpose. Appended is a good bibliography.

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THE VITALITY OF THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION edited by George F. Thomas. *Harpers*, 1944. Pp. xi + 358. \$3.00.

This book, by a group of Modernists, is an effort at the development of the *unconscious* thesis that Modernism lacks but still needs an objective basis.

The book is a series of essays, strung together with remarkable skill and producing an effective unity of impact on the mind of the reader. The authors, scholarly and zealous Fellows of "The National Council on Religion in Higher Education," speak only for themselves, but their voices are concordant. They trace in separate essays the "development from their beginnings in the Bible to the present day the major insights and values of the Christian tradition."

The first half of the book is a record of God's dealings with men from "The Faith of Ancient Israel"—the first essay—to "The Nineteenth Cen-

tury and Today," really the last essay in this first part. Throughout this part the Voice of Reason speaks, of that Reason which the Modernist acknowledges, although twinges and angularities, the authors' inheritance from the typically Protestant part of their thinking, manifest themselves with fairly consistent regularity. Christ, for example, is denied His Godhead, yet there is a definite desire "to lay hold on Jesus." Thomas Aquinas is recognized and applauded with fulsome and just praise, and then singularly misunderstood and interpreted in a way that Thomas would spontaneously and coldly reject. Luther is idolized, yet no one of the writers would feel happy if Luther returned to the world today!

The first part ends with an essay that belongs with "The Sword of the Spirit" idea, and is a manifest effort, a plea really—and bold, I suppose, in the context—to have those in the Protestant atmosphere come out from their intense subjectivism and bathe their souls in the objective, healing, character-forming "Devotional Literature" of Catholicism!

The first part can best be understood if one keeps constantly in mind such a fine work as *Christus: Manuel d'Histoire des Religions*, edited by Father Huby, Englished in the good C. T. S. edition and recently re-edited under Father Messenger.

The second part of the book is much more valuable than the first. Here we are shown that God-fearing men must have objective standards. We are pretty clearly convinced from the evidence that the world is living on an inheritance, but little understood and often even manifesting itself in almost Puckish paradox. Christ and His religion, and His "values," unclear, very poorly glimpsed, are nevertheless still in the modern atmosphere by way of words whose connotation is Christian, by way of views whose only justification is Christian, by way of customs whose only meaning is really Christian. We are taught that even the most determined "radicals" still feel the effects of Christianity. As Father Martindale once said: "Paganism today can never be quite what it was before Christ came, for on a thousand altars He hides, still strongly present."

After the introductory essay Christianity is squared off against Modern Philosophy, Physical Science, Contemporary Psychology, Ethics, Western Thought, and Democracy. In these essays much acumen is manifest, much just criticism is expressed, much sound reaching out for objective and valid norms is presented. It is an illuminating and wholesome appreciation of the topics treated.

The timeliness and in a certain sense the thesis of this second part can be glimpsed from the following quotation:

"The full implication of reductionism for man and his morality were understood at first only by a few daring thinkers such as Nietzsche. But within the last two generations these implications have been made increasingly clear as Freud and others have attacked the very conception of man as a rational and spiritual being. On the Freudian view, man's personality is largely the product, not of an ideal of the self consciously envisaged and realized, but of the interaction of impersonal biological impulses and social pressures. With this naturalistic reductionism in the ascendancy it is no wonder that in totalitarian ideologies the primary driving forces of human life are regarded as irrational, e.g., blood and will-to-power. Nor is it surprising that in democracies like our own the unlimited pleasure and profit and irresponsible liberty of the individual are accepted by many as the ultimate goal of life."

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